A & B Irrigation District v. Idaho Dept of Water Resources Cross Appellant\u27s Reply 2 Dckt. 38403 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-29-2011
A & B Irrigation District v. Idaho Dept of Water
Resources Cross Appellant's Reply 2 Dckt. 38403
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"A & B Irrigation District v. Idaho Dept of Water Resources Cross Appellant's Reply 2 Dckt. 38403" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court
Records & Briefs. 3131.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3131
Docket No. 38403-2011 
38421-2011 and 38422-2011 
Minidoka Connty District Conrt Case No. 2009-647 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DELIVERY CALL OF A&B IRRIGATION 
DISTRICT FOR THE DELIVERY OF GROUND WATER AND FOR THE CREATION OF A 
GROUND WATER MANAGEMENT AREA 
A&B IRRIGATION DISTRICT, 
Petitioner-Appellant 
v. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, and GARY SPACKMAN, in his official 
capacity as Interim Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources; 
Defendants-Respondents, 
and 
THE IDAHO GROUND WATER APPROPRIATORS, INC.; THE CITY OF POCATELLO, 
Respondents-Cross-Appellants 
and 
FREMONT MADISON IRRIGATION DISTRICT; ROBERT & SUE HUSKINSON; SUN-
GLO INDUSTRIES; VAL SCHWENDIMAN FARMS, INC.; DAVID SCHWENDIMAN 
FARMS, INC.; DARRELL C. NEVILLE; SCOTT C. NEVILLE; STAN D. NEVILLE, 
District COUlt Intervenors. 
CROSS-APPELLANT IDAHO GROUND WATER APPROPRIATORS, INC.'S 
("IGW A" or "GROUND WATER USERS") 
OPENING BRIEF AND RESPONSE BRIEF 
On Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
of the State ofIdaho, in and for the County of Minidoka. 
Honorable Eric Wildman, District Judge, Presiding. 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS- CROSS-
ApPELLANTS 
Randall C. Budge (ISB #1949) 
Candice M. McHugh (ISB #5908) 
Thomas J. Budge (ISB #7465) 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
201 East Center St.; Post Office Box 13 91 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
(208) 232-6101 - Telephone 
(208) 232-6109 - Facsimile 
Attorneys for Idaho Ground Water Appropriators 
A. Dean Tranmer 
City of Pocatello 
P. O. Box 4169 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
(208) 234-6149 
(208) 234-6297 (Fax) 
dtranmer@pocatello.us 
Sarah A. Klahn 
White & Jankowski, LLP 
511 Sixteenth Street, Suite 500 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
(303) 595-9441 
(303) 825-5632 (Fax) 
sarahk@white-jankowski.com 
Attorneys for the City of Pocatello 
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER-ApPELLANT 
Travis L. Thompson 
Jolm K. Simpson 
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON, LLP 
113 Main Avenue West, Suite 303 
Post Office Box 485 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0485 
(208) 733-0700 - Telephone 
(208) 735-2444 - Facsimile 
Attorneys for A&B Irrigation District. 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS-
RESPONDENTS ON ApPEAL 
Garrick Baxter 
Chris M. Bromley 
IDAHO DEPT. OF WATER RESOURCES 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0098 
(208) 287-4800 - Telephone 
(208) 287-6700 - Facsimile 
Attorneysfor the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources 
CROSS-APPELLANT IDAHO GROUND WATER APPROPRIATORS, INC.'S OPENING BRIEF AND 
RESPONSE BRIEF 2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................................................. 7 
A. Nature of the Case .................................................................................................................. 7 
B. The Course of the Proceedings .............................................................................................. 7 
C. Statement of Facts ................................................................................................................ 10 
II. IGWA'S ISSUE PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL ...................................................... 14 
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT ........................................................... 15 
OF IGWA'S ISSUE ON APPEAL ............................................................................................... 15 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO IGWA'S ISSUE ON APPEAL ............... 16 
V. ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF IGWA'S ISSUE ON APPEAL.. ..................................... 16 
A. Preponderance of the Evidence Standard Generally Applies in Civil and Administrative 
Hearings ........................................................................................................................................ 16 
B. Adjudicative Acts Relating to Water Rights Differ from Administrative Acts to Distribute 
Water Under Established Water Rights and As Recognized by Courts in Other Jurisdictions 
Require Different Standards of Proof ........................................................................................... 17 
C. Key Holdings and Rationale inAFRD2 Support Preponderance of the Evidence as the 
Standard of Proof .......................................................................................................................... 19 
1. The Agency Order Finding No Material Injury Does Not Adjudicate Water Rights Nor 
Alter A&B's Water Right; Hence, Preponderance of The Evidence Standard is the 
Proper Standard of Proof ............................................................................................... 20 
2. AFRD2 Provides a Framework for the Director to Make Administrative Decisions 
under the CM Rules ....................................................................................................... 21 
3. The Director's Conclusion of No Injury is an "Administrative" Determination and the 
Resulting Agency Order Does Not Alter or Amend A&B's Water Right... .................. 25 
D. The "Presumption of Entitlement to Full Quantity" Gives Proper Weight to a Senior's 
Decreed Right ............................................................................................................................... 26 
E. The Policy of the Ground Water Act is Best Served by the Preponderance of the 
Evidence Standard in Evaluating Whether the Senior is Materially Injured ................................ 27 
F. The Cases Cited by the District COUIt Are Adjudicative Cases, Not Applicable to 
Groundwater Administrative Cases .............................................................................................. 28 
1. Cases to Grant New Appropriations Require Heightened Proof to SUppOlt A New Use 
from a Stream But do not Answer the Question Presented in this Case ........................ 29 
2. The Standard of Proof for Adjudicating Water Rights or For Prevailing on Affimlative 
Defenses Does Not Apply to Groundwater Administrative Determinations under the 
CM Rules ....................................................................................................................... 32 
VI. ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO A&B'S APPELLANT'S BRIEF ................................. 33 
A. Standard of Review for A&B's Issues on Appeal ............................................................... 33 
B. A&B's Irrigation Water Right No. 36-2080 is Subject to the Idaho Ground Water Act .... 34 
CROSS-APPELLANT IDAHO GROUND WATER APPROPRIATORS, INC. 'S OPENING BRIEF AND 
RESPONSE BRIEF 3 
I. This Comi's Decision in Clear Springs v. Spackman Rejects A&B's Argument.. ....... 34 
2. The Act's Plain Language and Case Law Supports the Conclusion that the Ground 
Water Act Applies to A&B's Water Right No. 36-2080 ............................................... 35 
3. Legislative History Shows that the Ground Water Act Applies to A&B's Right ......... 38 
4. Public Policy Supports that the Ground Water Act Applies .......................................... 41 
C. A&B is Not Water Short, Has Sufficient Water to Meet Its Beneficial Use Therefore The 
Director Need Not Set a Reasonable Pumping Level.. ................................................................. 42 
D. The Director Properly Evaluated A&B's Use and Diversion of Water Under its Unique 
Water Right ................................................................................................................................... 45 
VII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 48 
CROSS-APPELLANT IDAHO GROUND WATER APPROPRIATORS, INC. 'S OPENING BRIEF AND 
RESPONSE BRIEF 4 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
A & B Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho Conservation League, 131 Idaho 411, 422, 958 P.2d 568, 579 
(1997) ........................................................................................................................................ 45 
American Falls Reservoir District No.2 v. Idaho Dep't o/Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862,154 
P.3d 433 (2007) .................................................................................................................. passim 
Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627 (1973) ....................................... passim 
Barron v. Idaho Dep't o/Water Resources, 135 Idaho 414, 18 P.3d 219, 222 (2001) ................. 34 
Bongiovi v. Jamison, 110 Idaho 734 (1986) ................................................................................. 27 
Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611 (1991) ................................................................................ 17 
Cantlin v. Carter, 88 Idaho 179 (1964) ........................................................................................ 30 
Cardenas v. Kwpjuweit, 116 Idaho 739, 742-43, 779 P.2d 414, 417-18 (1989) .......................... 18 
Castaneda v. Brighton COIp., 130 Idaho 923, 950 P.2d 1262 (1998) .......................................... 34 
Clear Springs Foods v. Clear Lakes Troul, 136 Idaho 761 (2002) .............................................. 27 
Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 252 P. 3d 71 (2011) ............................................. passim 
Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984) ......................................................... 31 
Crow v. Carlson, 107 Idaho 461, 467, 690 P.2d 916, 922 (1984) ........................................... 18,32 
Farmer's Co-operative Ditch Co. v. Riverside Irrigation Dist., Ltd., 16 Idaho 525,102 P. 481 
(1909) ........................................................................................................................................ 28 
Gilbertv. Smilh, 97 Idaho 735, 738, 553 P.2d 1220, 1224 (1976) .................................... 18,25,33 
Idaho Dept. o/Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 36, 244 P.3d 180 (2010) ............................ 17 
Idaho Stale Bar v. Top, 129 Idaho 414, 415, 925 P.2d 1113,11114 (1996) ................................. 18 
In reAdoption o/Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 141 P.3d 1057 (2006) ..................................................... 17 
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 120 Idaho 379, 816 P2d. 335 (1991) .................................................. 17,25,33 
Jenkins v. State, 103 Idaho 384, 647 P.2d 1256 (1982) ......................................................... 17,18 
Jones v. Vanausdeln, 28 Idaho 743, 156 P. 615 (1916) ............................................ 31,32 
Josslyn v. Daly, 15 Idaho 137 (1908) ............................................................................... 30, 31, 32 
Moe v. Harger, 10 Idaho 302 (1904) ................................................................................. 30, 31,32 
Mountain Home Irrigation Dist. v. Dz!fJy, 79 Idaho 435, 319 P2d 965 (1957) ............................ 42 
Moyle v. Idaho Dep'l o/Water Resources, Case No. CV OT 08014978 (4th Jud. Dis!. July 13, 
2009) (Addendum A) .......................................................................................................... 38, 39 
Musser v. Higginson, 125 Idaho 392, 871 P.2d 809 (1994) ......................................................... 38 
N Frontiers v. State ex rei. Cade, 129 Idaho 437, 439 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) ............................ 17 
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584 (1993) ................................................................................. 19 
Neil v. Hyde, 32 Idaho 576, 578, 186 P. 710, 710 (1919) ............................................................. 31 
Nettleton v. Higginson, 98 Idaho 87, 558 P.2d 1048 (1977) ........................................................ 42 
Niday v. Barker, 16 Idaho 73,101 P. 254 (1909) ......................................................................... 29 
Noh v. Stoner, 53 Idaho 651,26 P.2d 1112 (1933) ....................................................................... 35 
Payette River Property Owners Assn. v. Board o/Coll1m 'rs, 132 Idaho 551, 976 P.2d 477 (1999) 
................................................................................................................................................... 34 
Poole v. Olaveson, 82 Idaho 496, 356 P.2d 61 (1960) ................................................................. 29 
Schodde v. Twin Falls Water Co., 224 U.S. 107 (1911) ............................................................... 29 
Silkeyv. Tiegs, 51 Idaho 344, 5 P.2d 1049 (1931) ............................................................. 18, 25,32 
Silkeyv. Tiegs, 54 Idaho 126,28 P.2d 1037 (1934) .................................................... 18, 25, 32, 33 
State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 978 P.2d 214 (Ct. App. 1999) ................................................. 39 
State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983) .................................................................. 39 
CROSS-APPELLANT IDAHO GROUND WATER APPROPRIATORS, INC'S OPENING BRIEF AND 
RESPONSE BRIEF 5 
State v. Kimball, 145 Idaho 542, 181 P.3d 468 (2008) ................................................................. 17 
United States v. Pioneer 11'1'. Dist., 144 Idaho 106, 157 P.3d 600 (2007) .................................... 12 
Vickers v. Lowe, 150 Idaho 439, 442, 247 P.3d 666, 669 (2011) ........................................... 17,34 
Willadsen v. Christo pulos, 731 P.2d 1181 (Wyo. 1987) .............................................................. 19 
Statutes 
Idaho Code § 16-2009 ................................................................................................................... 17 
Idaho Code § 42-101 ............................................................................................................... 21,29 
Idaho Code § 42-226 ......................................................................................................... 21,28,29 
Idaho Code § 42-227 ........................................................................................................ 36" 40, 41 
Idaho Code § 42-228 ............................................................................................................... 36,40 
Idaho Code § 42-229 .............................................................................................................. passim 
Idaho Code § 42-226 .............................................................................................................. passim 
Idaho Code § 42-607 ..................................................................................................................... 43 
Idaho Code § 42-1701 ............................................................................................................. 21, 34 
Idaho Code § 42-170IA ................................................................................................................ 34 
Idaho Code § 66-329 ..................................................................................................................... 17 
Idaho Code § 67-5251 ................................................................................................................... 21 
Idaho Code § 67-5277 ............................................................................................................ " ..... 34 
Idaho Code § 67-5279 ............................................................................................................. 17, 34 
Other Authorities 
2 Am Jur.2d Administrative Law § 363 1994 ............................................................................... 17 
1951 Idaho Sess. Laws, eh. 200, § I, p. 423 ................................................................................. 40 
1951 Idaho Sess. Laws, eh. 200, § 2, p. 424 ................................................................................. 40 
1951 Idaho Sess. Laws, eh. 200, § 4, p. 424 .......... , ...................................................................... 40 
1987 Idaho Sess. Laws, eh. 347, § I, p. 743 ................................................................................. 41 
1987 Idaho Sess. Laws, eh. 347, § 3, p. 741 ................................................................................. 41 
Rules 
IDAP A 37.0 I. 0 I. 600 '"'''''''''''''' ........................ : .......................................................................... 21 
IDAP A 37.03.11, CM Rule 10.14 ................................................................................................. 25 
IDAP A 37.03.11, CM Rule 20.05 ................................................................................................. 25 
IDAP A 37.03.11, CM Rule 40 ...................................... """""",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ......................... 43 
ID AP A 37.03.11, CM Rule 42.0 I ........................................................................................... 25, 26 
CROSS-APPELLANT IDAHO GROUND WATER APPROPRIATORS, INC.'S OPENING BRIEF AND 
RESPONSE BRIEF 6 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves the tlrst groundwater to groundwater delivery call under the Idaho 
Department of Water Resources ("IDWR" or "Department") Conjunctive Management Rules for 
Surface and Ground Water Resources, IDAPA 37.01.01 et seq. ("CM Rules"). It is also the 
first case where, under application of the CM Rules, the Director found that the senior user, 
A&B Irrigation District ("A&B"), was not materially injured. R. 1151,3318. As such, this is 
the first case where IGWA, representing the junior groundwater users who would have been 
curtailed if it had been determined that A&B was materially injured, pmiicipated in the hearing 
at the agency level to present evidence in support of the Director's finding of no injury. 
IGW A's cross-appeal is limited to a single issue regarding the proper evidentiary standard of 
proof to be applied to the evaluation of material injury under the CM Rules. The district court 
concluded "in order to give the proper presumptive weight to a decree any finding by the director 
that the quantity decreed exceeds that being put to beneficial use must be supported by clear and 
convincing evidence." Clerk's R. 82. The district COUlt then remanded the matter back to the 
Director. This holding and direction to the Director to use the clear and convincing evidence 
standard when evaluating the amount of water needed by the senior for beneficial use and 
whether he is materially injured is the subject of IGW A's appeal. 
B. The Course of the Proceedings 
On July 26, 1994, A&B filed a Petition for Delivery Call ("Delivery Call") with the 
Department, requesting that the Director take actions "necessary to insure the delivery of ground 
water to [A&B] as provided by its water right, to .... protect the people of the State ofIdaho of 
depletion of ground water resources which have caused material injury to [A&Bj, and to 
designate the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer as a ground water management area .... " R. 12-14. 
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A&B's Delivery Call requested the director to administer its 1948 priority water right no. 36-
2080 against junior groundwater users who divert water iimn the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer 
("ESP A") which would result in curtailment of vir1ually all other groundwater users diverting 
water from the ESP A. The par1ies to the proceeding stipulated to stay the contested case. R. 
670-76. On March 16, 2007, A&B filed a Motion to Proceed, requesting that the stay be lifted 
and that the Depar1ment proceed with resolution of its Delivery Call. R. 830. On January 29, 
2008, IDWR issued an Order ("January 2008 Order") denying A&B's Delivery Call and Motion 
to Proceed and determined that, under the CM Rules, A&B had not suffered any material injury 
and was not ShOli of water. R.1105. 
A&B filed a petition requesting an administrative hearing to challenge the January 2008 
Order. R. 1182. An evidentiary hearing was conducted December 3-17, 2008, before Hearing 
Officer Gerald F. Schroeder. Several interested parties participated in the hearing, including 
IGWA, City of Pocatello and Upper Snake River Water Users. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 2-3. 
On March 27, 2009, the Hearing Officer entered his Opinion Constituting Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Recommendations ("Reconmlended Order"), which agreed with the 
January 2008 Order's conclusion that A&B's water right no. 36-2080 had not suffered material 
injury. R. 3078. A Director's Final Order Regarding the A&B Delivery Call issued June 30, 
2009 ("Agency Order") which again denied A&B's Delivery Call and found no material injury. 
R.3318. On August 31, 2009, A&B filed a Notice of Appeal on Petition for Judicial Review of 
Agency Action. Clerk's R. 1. 
The district cOUl1 reviewed A&B's appeal. The Judgment dated November 23, 2010 issued 
by the district COUlt held, among other things that a "clear and convincing evidence" standard 
applies. Clerk's R. 127. The Judgment incorporates a Memorandum Decision and Order on 
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Petition for Judicial Review entered May 4, 2010, ("Decision on Judicial Review"), and a 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Petitions for Rehearing entered November 2, 2010, 
("Decision on Rehearing"). Clerk's R. 45 and 106. The district court's Judgment and Decision 
on Judicial Review and Decision on Rehearing will be referred to collectively herein as 
"Judgment and Decisions." The Judgment and Decisions upheld the substantive issues that were 
in the Agency Order and the subject of A&B's appeal: 
This Court agrees that the system must be considered as a whole based on the way in 
which the water right is decreed. Further, that the extent to which the Director may 
require A & B to move water around within the Unit prior to regulating junior 
pumpers is left to the discretion of the Director. The Director concluded that A & B 
must make reasonable efforts to maximize intercollllection of the system and placed 
the burden on A & B to demonstrate where interconnection is not physically or 
financially practical. The Director did not abuse discretion in imposing such a 
requirement. 
Clerk's R. 83, see also Clerk's R. 93-94 and 140. But the district court remanded the case to the 
Director because he "fail [ ed] to apply the evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence 
in conjunction with the finding that the quantity decreed to A&B's 36-2080 exceeds the quantity 
being put to beneficial use for purposes of determining material injury." Clerk's R. 93, see also 
Clerk's R. 124. Thus, the district court remanded the case to the director for the purpose of 
applying the correct evidentiary standard. ld. The district court concluded that the Director must 
administer to the full decreed quantity unless he is convinced that a lesser quantity is needed to 
meet the senior's beneficial use under a clear and convincing evidence standard. ld. 
On June 10,2010, IGWA filed a petition for rehearing regarding the court's ruling on the 
finding that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies in an administrative delivery call. 
Clerk's R. Supp. Ex., Petition for Rehearing, June 10, 2010; Ground Water Users' Opening 
Brief on Rehearing, August 5, 2010; Ground Water Users' Reply Brief on Rehearing, September 
7, 2010. The City of Pocatello also filed for rehearing on the issue of what is the proper 
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evidentiary standard when evaluating material injury. Clerk's R. Supp. Ex., City of Pocatello's 
Brief in Support of Rehearing, June 29, 2010. The district court denied the relief sought by 
IGWA and the City of Pocatello and entered a Decision on Rehearing on November 2, 2010, 
concluding that "the application of a clear and convincing standard to the determination that a 
senior can get by with less water than decreed is consistent with the established presumptions 
and standards of proof." Clerk's R. 124. This issue of law regarding the proper standard is the 
single subject of IGW A's appeal. 
C. Statement of Facts 
The United States Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") built the A&B irrigation project and 
began to develop the groundwater resource on the ESP A in the late 1950s. R. 1111. The Bureau 
secured a water right license with a priority date of September 9,1948, for use by A&B farmers. 
Ex.l57B (Ex. 157 at 4181). A&B's 1948 priority date groundwater right is senior to virtually 
all other groundwater rights that use water from the ESP A. 
A&B's irrigation system consists of two separate and distinct water supplies and irrigation 
systems. R. 1665. The A Unit is supplied by surface water rights delivered from the Snake River 
and irrigates approximately 15,000 acres. [d. The B Unit is a complex inigation system supplied 
by groundwater rights and irrigates over 66,600 acres. [d. Only the B Unit 1948 priority 
groundwater right is the subject of the delivelY call and at issue in this appeal. R. 1105. 
A&B's groundwater right is unique because the 1,100 cfs quantity can be used on any of the 
B Unit lands and can be diverted from any or all of its 188 points of diversion. Tr. Vol. VI, p. 
1160, L. 2 - p. 1161, L. 9. This was intentional and at the Bureau's specific insistence. In its 
Definite Plan Report dated February 1955, the Bureau explained its intent for this water right and 
its use: 
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In the best interest of the Division as a whole, the permit [for the groundwater right that 
will become water right 36-2080] is upon the basis that all the wells will, as a group, be 
appurtenant to all the lands of the entire Division, rather than being made appurtenant to a 
particular parcel of land. This would pemlit a more satisfactory distribution of water to 
lands and maximum over-all development. 
Ex. 111A at 73. When evaluating the licensing of A&B's water right,. the Department 
questioned the Bureau's intent and asked for a land list that would be served by each well. Ex. 
157 at 4398. In response, the Bureau made it clear that it wanted the water right licensed in 
order to provide for the greatest amount of flexibility in distributing water throughout the project 
and did not want to tie any well to any particular parcel of land. The Bureau's response letter 
said in pali: 
Your letter ... also asked for a list of lands. 
We emphasize that the project is one integrated system, physically, operationally, and 
financially. Some lands, pending on project operational requirements, can be served 
from water from several wells. Therefore, it is impractical and undesirable to 
designate precise land areas within the project served only by each of the specific 
wells on the list. 
Ex. 157D (Ex. 157 at 4396); R. 3094. To snpport this "integrated" system, the rate of diversion 
for the right is also in the cumulative and does not ascribe any rate of diversion to any patiicular 
well. Exs. 139 and 157A (Ex. 157 at 3772). 
Water right no. 36-2080 has since been "patiially decreed" in the Snake River Basin 
Adjudication ("SRBA") to the Bureau in trust for beneficial use by A&B landowners. R. Ex. 
139. See United States v. Pioneer Jrr. Dist., 144 Idaho 106, 157 P.3d 600 (2007). After the entry 
of the pat1ial decree, water right no. 36-2080, at A&B's request, was subject to a transfer 
proceeding before IDWR. Ex. 157A (Ex: 157 at 3772-3801). The approved transfer continues 
to allow for the use of the 1,100 cfs on any of the B Unit lands and approved an additional 11 
wells, thus allowing A&B to use up to 188 wells. Ex. 157A (Ex. 157 at 3773-79). Yet, A&B 
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operates only 177 wells to provide irrigation water to its members to inigate approximately 
66,600 acres under its water right and 4,000 additional acres under A&B's beneficial use and 
enlargement water rights. R. 1113; Exs. 406 and 407; Tr. Vol. III, p. 503, L. 19 - p. 504, L. 8. 
While the water right allows for maximum flexibility and interconnection, not all the well 
systems are interconnected, rather, the B Unit continues to be comprised of 130 independent well 
systems. Ex. 200 at 3-26; Tr. Vol. III. p. 614, L. 10-16. 
A&B claims water shOliage because it cannot divert the authorized maximum diversion rate 
of 0.88 inches per acre on evelY acre within its boundaries, even though in the entire history of 
A&B, that amount has never been delivered to all its acres even for one day, Tr. Vol. III, p. 632, 
L. 10 - p. 634, L. 23. "Going back at least to 1963 it does not appear that there was a time when 
all well systems could produce 0.88 miner's inches per acre." R. 3108, Tr. Vol. VIII, p. 1667, L. 
20-p.1671, L. 3. 
Furthelmore, evidence presented by A&B's own witnesses contradicts its allegations of 
shortage. A&B farmers testified that they meet their producer contracts for potatoes, sugar beets 
and barley. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 826-828; Tr. Vol. V, pp. 1027-1030; Tr. Vol. V, pp. 907-908; Tr. 
Vol. V, p. 994; R. 2907 - 09. The cross examination of A&B falTller witnesses Adams, Eames, 
Kostka and Molhman clearly established no verifiable evidence of any fallowed ground or 
unharvested crops. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 722, L. 13 - p. 723, L. 12, Tr. Vol. V, p. 905, L. 23 - p. 906, 
L. II, Tr. Vol. V, p. 985, L. 12 - p. 986, L. 4, p. 989, L. 4-12, p. 992, L. 15-25, p. 993, L. 6-21. 
And, their crop yields have increased steadily over the years and exceed the connty averages. cf 
Exs. 355A and 358 with 357 (two of A&B witnesses' crop yields as compared to the Minidoka 
County averages). A&B farmers have had a steady and reliable headgate delivery of 3 acre-feet 
per acre which exceeds the crop water requirements of adjacent farmers who only use 2 acrecfeet 
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per acre. Tr. Vol. X, p. 2069, 1. 1-7, p. 2088, L. 2-11, p. 2121,1. 19 - p. 2122, 1. 6, p. 2138,1. 
12-16, p. 2138, 1. 17 - p. 2139, 1. 13. Evidence in the record also shows that "crops could be 
grown and that the lands in question were in no worse condition than the sUlTounding areas." R. 
3104; Tr. Vol. VI p. 1104,1106-1108 (Department's analysis of evapotranspiration); see also, 
Tr. Vol. X, pp. 2088, 2138, and 2074-2076, 2089-90. "The evidence indicates that farmers 
outside the A&B project are often able to raise crops to full maturity on less water than is used 
on the Unit B lands." R. 3106; Tr. Vol. X, pp. 2074-2076, 2090; Tr. Vol. V, p. 1070. The A&B 
actual delivery rate of 0.75 cfs is "higher than nearby surface water users." R. 3107; Tr. Vol. V, 
p. 1070 - p. 1071,1. 2, Vol. X, p. 2036. "Crops may be grown to full maturity on less water than 
demanded by A&B in this delivery call." R. 3107. 
FUlther, despite claims of water shortages, A&B developed and continues to irrigate over 
4,000 additional acres with its 177 wells. Exs. 406 and 407; Tr. Vol. III, p. 503,1. 19 - p. 504, 
1. 8. These 4,000 acres are in addition to what is authorized in A&B's water right no. 36-2080. 
Id. This increase in irrigation is driven in part from improved efficiencies within the A&B 
system such as the conversion from flood to sprinkler ilTigation. Id. 
Although the Bureau knew at the time when choosing the location of the B Unit project that 
the southwest area would have lower well yields. Ex. 123 at 1170-74; Ex. 152QQ, Tr. Vol. IX, 
pp. 1765-1767. The Bureau predictions were proven conect and improvements in water supply 
in the southwest area are less feasible due to hydrogeology problems, not outside junior 
groundwater pumping, and as a result A&B has convelted some lands to surface water. Ex. 215; 
Tr. Vol. III, p. 566,1. 11- p. 567, L. 2, Vol. IV, p. 683,1. 6-11, p. 691, 1. 7-9, p. 703, 1. 11-13. 
Like any irrigator, A&B throughout its history has needed to replace wom or failing pumps, 
motors and well equipment, deepen existing wells, and drill new wells. R. 1132-34. A&B has 
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also eliminated drains and open ditches, intercOimected some well systems, and shifted lmld from 
less productive well systems to more productive well systems. R. 1131-33. The evidence is 
overwhelming that A&B's efforts to improve water supply in its project have and continue to be 
successful in maintaining reasonable and adequate water supplies to raise full crops, as readily 
admitted by A&B's manager Dan Temple. Tr. Vol. IV. p. 664, L. 5-17, p. 667, L 14 - p. 668, L. 
5; Ex. 414 and 427-9. The associated costs incurred to continue to operate the system 
successfully were nonnal, expected and consistent with operational expenses incurred by farmers 
outside the A&B system. Even A&B's own consultant agrees that this case is not about water 
shortage, but simply about costs of operating and maintaining their system. Tr. Vol. VI., p. 
1306, L. 19-23; Tr. Vol. IV, p. 757, L. 15 - p. 758, L. 6. 
In sum, the Agency Order concluded that A&B fmmers were not short of water; that there 
was an adequate water supply available to A&B, R. 1117- 1120 and 3110; that its fmmers used 
the same or more water to irrigate their crops than surrounding farmers, R. 3107; that any water 
supply issues in the southwest area were not due to junior groundwater pumping but were due to 
the local hydrogeology, R. 1128-1130 and 3113; mld, therefore there was no injury to A&B's 
water right. R. 1150-51 and 3322-23. 
II. IGW A'S ISSUE PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
For purposes of water right administration under the CM Rules when the Director is 
evaluating whether there is material injury, did the District Court err in remanding the matter to 
the Director to require his evaluation be made under a clear and convincing evidence standard 
instead of a preponderance of the evidence standard? 
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III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT IN SUl'PORT 
OF IGW A'S ISSUE ON AI'PEAL 
This Comi should reverse the district court's decision to remand and hold that clear and 
convincing evidence is not required for administrative determinations regarding material injury. 
Idaho case law does not have a case that answers the question in this appeal. The cases cited and 
relied on by the district court are all adjudicative cases that decree water rights, alter or amend 
existing water rights or involve affitmative defenses to cnrtailment of jnniors such as futile call; 
as such, they apply the clear and convincing evidence standard. However, there are several 
reasons a preponderance of the evidence standard should be used in administrative cases that 
apply the CM Rules in a delivery call against groundwater nsers. First, most civil suit decisions, 
like agency administrative decisions, are govemed by a preponderance of the evidence standard. 
Second, the heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence, in the water law arena, is 
applied only to cases where water rights are pennanently fixed or altered or for a futile call 
defense and courts in other jurisdictions have determined that a preponderance of the evidence 
standard applies when administering water between established water rights. Third, this Comi's 
opinion in American Falls Reservoir District No. 2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water Resources 
("AFRD2''), 143 Idaho 862, 154 P.3d 433 (2007), supports using a preponderance of the 
evidence standard of proof and found that the "presumption of full quantity" gives the proper 
legal effect to a decree. Fomih, using a preponderance of the evidence standard best serves the 
policy of the Idaho Ground Water Act, I.C. §§ 42-226 et. seq. Finally, examination of the cases 
relied on by the district court shows that they adjudicate water rights or seek to pelmanently alter 
water rights instead of cases that administer groundwater rights. Each argument will be 
addressed in turn. 
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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO IGWA'S ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Judicial review of IGW A's issue on appeal concerns a pure question of law, as such, this 
COutt exercises free review of the district COutt's decision regarding the proper standard for 
proof required in an administrative delivery call under the CM Rules. Vickers v. Lowe, 150 
Idaho 439, 442, 247 P.3d 666, 669 (2011); I.C. § 67-5279. 
V. ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF IGW A'S ISSUE ON APPEAL 
A. Preponderance of the Evidence Standard Generally Applies in Civil and 
Administrative Hearings. 
In most civil actions, "the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence, which 
means more probable than not." Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 622, 809 P.2d 472,483 
(1991). "[T]he preponderance of the evidence standard [is] generally applied in administrative 
hearings." N. Frontiers v. State ex rel. Cade, 129 Idaho 437, 439 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996), citing, 2 
AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law § 363 (1994). 
On the other hand, "clear and convincing" is one of the highest standards of persuasion in the 
civil law context. Clear and convincing evidence, for example, is evidence that makes a fact 
highly probable. "Clear and convincing" evidence refers to "a degree of proof greater than a 
mere preponderance." Jenkins v. Jenkins, 120 Idaho 379,.383, 816·P.2d 335,339 (1991). Clear 
and convincing evidence is understood to be "[ e Jvidence indicating that the thing to be proved is 
highly probable or reasonably certain.'" State v. Kimball, 145 Idaho 542, 546,181 P.3d 468,472 
(2008) (quoting]n re Adoption of Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006)); see 
also Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 36, 41, 244 P.3d 180, 185 (2010). The 
heightened evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence is generally applied to cases 
that involve pennanent deprivations of rights such as the involuntary termination of parental 
rights, I.C. § 16-2009; involuntary institutional commitment, I.e. § 66-329(11); claims of 
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professional misconduct of a lawyer, Idaho Siale Bar v. Top, 129 Idaho 414, 415, 925 P.2d 1113, 
1114 (1996), or the permanent deprivation ofreal property, Cardenas v. Kllrpjlll1'eit, 116 Idaho 
739,742-43,779 F.2d 414, 417-18 (1989). 
B. Adjudicative Acts Relating to Water Rights Differ from Administrative Acts to 
Distribute Water Under Established Water Rights and As Recognized by Courts in 
Other Jurisdictions Require Different Standards of Proof 
Similarly in the water law arena when one is seeking to deprive another of his water right, 
clear and convincing evidence applies. "One who seeks to alter decreed water priorities has the 
burden to demonstrate the elements of abandonment by clear and convincing evidence." Gilbert 
v. Smith, 97 Idaho 735, 738, 553 P.2d 1220, 1224 (1976). Clear and convincing evidence is 
required if a water user tries to acquire another's water right through adverse possession. Id. at 
740, 1225. Clear and convincing evidence is required if the state, through administrative action, 
is going to find forfeiture or abandonment of a water right. Jenkins v. Slate, 103 Idaho 384, 
388-89,647 P.2d 1256, 1260-61 (1982). Clear and convincing evidence is also required in water 
adjudication cases or quiet title cases where the Court is asked to allow new appropriations and 
pelmanently fix title to water rights and establish priority dates and quantities. Crow v. Carlson, 
107 Idaho 461, 467, 690 P.2d 916, 922 (1984); Silkey v. Tiegs, 51 Idaho 344, 5 P.2d 1049 
(1931); Silkey v. Tiegs, 54 Idaho 126, 28 P.2d 1037 (1934) ("Silkey II''). Finally, clear and 
convincing evidence is required in order to prevail in a futile call defense situation which allows 
a junior water user to deprive a senior user of water because curtailment of the junior user will 
not result in a usable quantity of water to the senior. Gilbert, 97 Idaho at 739, 553 P.2d at 1224. 
These cases either permanently alter water rights, fix title to water rights, or deprive a senior of 
water even though they need the water because the call is futile. The foregoing examples are 
adjudicative acts because they permanently eliminate, redefine, or extend (in whole in or part) 
the elements of the water use. 
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In contrast to adjudicative acts, the allocation of water between existing water rights as an 
administrative function does not alter the defined elements of individual water rights. In other 
words, the inquiry made in an administrative case regarding material in jUly uuder the CM Rules 
does not alter the senior's water right but evaluates the current need for water and applies the 
CM Rules and the Ground Water Act to the relief requested by a delivery call. 
This distinction of applying different standards of proof for different types of cases 
involving water rights issues was recognized in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 592 (1993) 
where the U.S. Supreme Court found enforcement (i.e. administrative) decisions involving 
established water rights should apply the preponderance of the evidence standard but that a 
modification of an established right requires a higher standard of proof; the court said, 
distributing water under established rights between parties does not require the higher standard 
of proof because the "two types of proceeding are markedly different." Id. at 592. Although 
Nebraska is an equitable apportiOlUllent case, it is analogous here. Nebraska sought enforcement 
of its already established right against the state of Wyoming and argued that enforcement (i.e. 
administration) cases should be governed under a preponderance of the evidence standard. !d. 
The Special Master and the Supreme COUli agreed. Id. at 592-593. Likewise, the state of 
Wyoming found that in a delivery call situation, preponderance of the evidence applied. 
Willadsen v. Christopu/os, 731 P.2d !l81, 1184 (Wyo. 1987) (the standard applicable to the 
State Engineer's investigation of whether the upstream well is interfering with the downstream 
right is the preponderance of the evidence standard customarily used in civil cases.) As these 
cOUlis recognized, once the juniors' right has been set, the issue before the Director is not just a 
matter of whether the junior should be allowed to start using water, but rather, whether he should 
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be allowed to continue his use or be indefinitely curtailed because of a need by the senior; the 
best way to evaluate evidence in that situation is by the preponderance of the evidence standard. 
The district comi's ruling in this case fails to recognize impOliant differences between 
adjudication of water rights that permanently establish, alter or reduce water rights as opposed to 
the administration of competing water rights under the CM Rules. As this Comi acknowledged 
in its decision in AFRD2: "water rights adjudications neither address, nor answer, the questions 
presented in delivery calls; thus, responding to delivery calls, as conducted pursuant to the CM 
Rules, do not constitute are-adjudication." AFRD2, 143 Idaho at 876-77, 154 P.3d at 447-48. 
Thus, the standard of proof (i.e. clear and convincing) used in adjudication cases should not just 
automatically be deemed the standard of proof that should be used in administrative cases. 
In this case, the district court mistakenly relied solely on water rights adjudication type cases 
to suppOli its ruling that in a water right administration proceeding under the CM Rules the 
Director must find that the senior user is entitled to the maximum amount authorized under his 
right unless he is convinced by the elevated standard of clear and convincing proof that a lesser 
quantity is needed. A more detailed discussion of the cases cited by the district court is contained 
below. 
C. Key Holdings and Rationale inAFRD2 Snpport Preponderance ofthe Evidence as 
the Standard of Proof 
An examination of this Court's ruling in AFRD2, is helpful because it shows that a delivery 
call proceeding is administrative in nature (as opposed to adjudicative), and thus, supports the 
application of the preponderance of the evidence standard. In AFRD2, this Comi did not 
enunciate the evidentiary standards that apply in water administration. Instead, it explained that 
"to the extent the Constitution, statutes and case law have identified the proper presumptions, 
burdens of proof, evidentiary standards and time parameters, those are part of the CM Rules." 
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AFRD2, 143 Idaho at 873, 154 PJd. at 444. While, no Idaho case directly addresses what 
standard of proof is required for purposes of water right administration under the CM Rules, tllls 
Court's rationale and holdings in AFRD2 lead to the conclusion that a preponderance of the 
evidence standard is the appropriate standard of proof. As such, the district COUlt'S remand 
requiring clear and convincing evidence should be reversed. 
1. The Agency Order Finding No Material Injury Does Not Adjudicate Water 
Rights NOI' Alter A&B's Water Right; Hence, Preponderance of The Evidence 
Standard is the Proper Standard of Proof 
Understanding the Director's role in administering water between established water rights is 
helpful in determining which standard of proof should apply. When it comes to allocating the 
use of water between existing water rights, the Legislature has instructed the Director to "equally 
guard all the various interests involved." Idaho Code § 42-101. With respect to groundwater 
specifically, the Director must ensure that "a reasonable exercise of [priority] shall not block full 
economic development of underground water resources." Idaho Code § 42-226. This Court in 
Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 252 P. 3d 71 (2011), held that the Director must also 
consider policies of optimum beneficial use and reasonable use of water. Clear Springs v. 
Spackman, 252 P.3d at **34. These decisions naturally require the exercise of discretion as this 
Court contemplated in AFRD2. AFRD2 at, 875, 154 P. 3d at 446. Accordingly, Idaho Code 
requires the Director to be a licensed engineer, (Idaho Code §42-1701(2)) and authorizes him to 
utilize his "experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge" when administering 
water. I.C. § 67-5251(5); see also IDAPA 37.01.01.600. 
CM Rule 42 "lists factors the Director may consider in determining material injury and 
whether the holders of water rights are using water efficiently and without waste, which are 
decisions properly vested in the Director. Those factors, of necessity, require some 
determination of 'reasonableness' .... " AFRD2, 143 Idaho at 875, 154 P.3d at 446. This COUlt 
CROSS-APPELLANT IDAHO GROUND WATER APPROPRIATORS, INC'S OPENING BRIEF AND 
RESPONSE BRIEF 20 
found that the CM Rules give the Director "tools" to use in order to determine whether a senior 
user is suffering material injury. Id at 878, 449. The factors the Director considers include: an 
evaluation of the effort or expense to divel1 from the source (42.0I.b); rate of diversion, acres, 
efficiencies, and irrigation method (42.0I.d); amount of water used compared to the water right 
( 42.0 I.e); whether the senior can meet their needs with existing facilities, reasonable diversion, 
conveyance efficiencies, conservation practices (42.0I.g); and altemate reasonable means of 
diversion or altemate points of diversion (42.0I.h). These factors assist the Director in 
determining whether the senior is "suffering material injury and using water efficiently and 
without waste" which may result in a conclusion that the senior needs less water than his full 
quantity to meet his beneficial use and that there is enough water available to meet that need. 
The evaluation of these factors does not result in an order that permanently fixes or alters the 
senior's water right. This Court recognized an examination of the amount of water needed for 
beneficial use is not a "re-adjudication" of the senior's water right. See AFRD2, 143 Idaho at 
876-77, 154 P. 3d at 445-46. 
Given these key policy considerations, the fact that the Director has specific expeJ1ise and 
must equally guard all interests involved when providing for the use of water, the factors set 
fOl1h in CM Rule 42 and the fact that the Director's role in an administrative delivery call does 
not adjudicate the senior's right, it follows, then, that these administrative decisions be made 
under the preponderance of the evidence standard. 
2. AFRD2 Provides a Framework for the Director to Make Administrative 
Decisions under the eM Rules 
In administering water under the CM Rules the Director must keep the above considerations 
in mind, but must also presume that the senior is entitled to their decreed amount of water. 
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AFRD2, 143 Idaho at 878, 154 P.3d at 449. The Court's key holdings in AFRD2 provide a 
framework for the Director to follow in response to a conjunctive management delivery call. 
First, the Director must be allowed to evaluate evidence that may be provided by the senior, 
in order to determine the amount of water needed for beneficial use. AFRD2, 143 Idaho at 875 
and 877, 154 P. 3d at 446 and 448. In AFRD2, this Court stated that the Director must be 
allowed to "evaluate whether the senior is putting the water to beneficial use, [otherwise 1 we 
would be ignoring the constitutional requirement that priority over water be extended only to 
those using the water." Id at 876, 447. This Court held that the Director must exercise his 
discretion when evaluating the CM Rule 42 factors: "Given the nature of the decisions which 
must be made in determining how to respond to a delivery call, there must be some exercise of 
discretion by the Director." Id at 875, 446. 
Second, there is not a presumption of injury to the senior, although the Director must 
presume the senior is entitled to its authorized maximum quantity. Id at 876-77, 447-48. 
Although this Court held that the Director must presume that the senior is entitled to its full 
decreed quantity it also held that the Director had a "duty" to examine the senior's cutTent needs 
for water and evaluate beneficial use and the factors set forth in CM Rule 42. Id. at 876, 447. In 
coming to this conclusion, this Court in AFRD2 rejected the argument that the Director must 
presume material injury to the senior. Id. at 877, 448. As such, the Court obviously 
contemplated that the Director could make a finding of no material injury, like in the present 
case where the Director found that A&B was not short of water, had enough water to meet its 
beneficial use and as such, was not suffering material injury. 
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Third, based on the foregoing, it follows that the Director's evaluation of evidence may result 
in an initial finding by the Director regarding whether or not the senior is suffering material 
injury. Id. at 878, 449. 
Fourth, an evaluation of the amount of water needed is not a re-adjudication of the senior's 
water right. Id. at 876-77, 447-48. While this Court held that the Director must presume that the 
senior is entitled to his full quantity, the COUIt concluded that the Director's evaluation of the 
amount of water needed by the senior for beneficial use when "responding to delivery calls, as 
conducted pursuant to the [CM Rules], doles] not constitute a re-adjudication." rd. 
Fifth, the water users that are palties to the proceeding are entitled to challenge the Director's 
findings of injury (or no injury) and juniors may also defend against the finding of material 
injury with affirmative defenses such as futile call and forfeiture. "Once the initial determination 
is made that material injury is occurring or will occur, the junior then bears the burden of proving 
that the call would be futile or to challenge, in some other constitutionally pemlissible way, the 
senior's call." Id. at 878, 449. 
It is apparent from AFRD2 that if the Director had found material injury to A&B, then the 
junior users could have responded by proving a futile call. Id. This would have precluded the 
cUitailment of juniors even though the senior was injured. The junior users could have also 
asked the Director to find that the senior had forfeited or abandoned all or part of its water right, 
which finding would have ended the delivery call and resulted in the water right being lost or 
permanently reduced. Id. The Director's rulings on these kinds of responses by the junior users 
would require the clear and convincing standard because the junior users would be asking for the 
Director to ignore a finding of injury either because there would be no remedy (i.e. futile call) or 
because the juniors were asking the Director to permanently alter a senior's water right. See 
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Crow, 107 Idaho 461, 690 P.2d 916; Silkey, 51 Idaho 344, 5 P.2d 1049; Silkey, 54 Idaho 126,28 
P.2d 1027; Jenkins, 103 Idaho 384, 647 P.2d 1256; and Gilbert, 97 Idaho 735, P.2d 1220. 
However, the question presented in this case, is what level of proof is required in determining 
"whether the holders of water rights are suffering material injury and using water efficiently and 
without waste" as set forth by eM Rule 42.01 and its factors, not what level of proof is required 
to pelmanently fix a water right or alter a senior's right or to allow injury to continue because 
there is no remedy. 
Material injury examines whether a junior user is hindering or impacting the exercise of a 
water right by a senior water user. eM Rule 10.14. Evaluating whether the exercise of a water 
right is hindered requires the Director to evaluate the "reasonableness of the diversion and use of 
water" by the senior. eM Rule 20.05. In evaluating whether the junior is hindering or 
impacting the exercise of the senior right, the Director examines evidence regarding the amount 
of water the senior user needs, has access to and divells: eM Rule 42.01.b (evaluation of the 
effort or expense to divell from the source); eM Rule 42.01.d. (evaluation of the rate of 
diversion, acres, efficiencies, irrigation method); eM Rule 42.01.e. (evaluation of the amount of 
water used compared to the water right). The Director also examines whether the senior's needs 
can be met and material injUly avoided with a quantity less than the authorized maximum by 
using the existing facilities, reasonable Ineans of diversion and ilnproving conveyance 
efficiencies and conservation practices. eM Rule 42.01.g. These types of administrative 
inquiries do not adjudicate or alter the senior's water right nor do they excuse injury. Evidence 
relating to these factors should be evaluated under a preponderance of the evidence standard 
because the Director is applying the eM Rules to determine need and material injury not altering 
the senior's right. 
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3. The Director's Conclusion of No Injury is an "Administrative" Determination 
and the Resulting Agency Order Does Not Alter or Amend A&B's Water Right 
In this case, the evidence showed that A&B has chosen not to fully exercise its water right by 
availing itself of the water right's flexibility which allows it to intercOlmect any or all of its 
points of diversion (i.e. wells). Ex. 481; Tr. Vol. VI,p. 1316, L. 18-p. 1318, L. 7, p. 1318, L. 
22 - p. 1319, L. 4; see CM Rule 42.0 l.g. (examination of the use of existing facilities, reasonable 
means of diversion, and conveyance efficiencies) and AFRD2, 143 Idaho at 877, 154 P.3d at 447 
("reasonableness is not an element of a water."). The evidence also showed that A&B's needs 
can be met with less water because, they now sprinkle 96% of their ground and no longer need 
the same amount of water as originally decreed for flood ilTigation. R. 1114-15; see CM Rule 
42.01.d. (ilTigation method) and e. (amount of water used compared to the water right) and 
AFRD2, 143 Idaho at 876, 154 P.3d at 447 (examine current needs, such as the number of acres 
ilTigated). The evidence showed that A&B farmers use more water than surrounding fanners 
and that their yields meet or exceed county averages and satisfy their contracts. Tr. Vol. X, pp. 
2074-76, 2090, Vol. IV, pp. 826-828, Vol. V, pp. 907-08, 994 and 1027-30; see CM Rule 
42.01.b (effort and expense to diveli); 42.01.d. (efficiencies, ilTigation method). Fmiher, even 
though A&B has the capacity to divert its full water right, it has chosen to leave 11 wells to sit 
idle (Ex. 157 A) and not pump other wells to full capacity; see CM Rule 42.01.d. e. and g. In 
addition, evidence shows that A&B's means of diversion are unreasonable because it did not 
consider the hydrogeology of the area, sited their wells in a poor location (Ex. 124 at 16; Ex. 121 
at 1090-91, Ex. 215) and did not drill the wells properly. Ex. 121 at 1131-32. 
In summary, given the type of evidence examined and the nature of the factors the Director is 
required to evaluate, as well as I.C. § 42-101 and this Court's holdings in AFRD2, this Court 
should hold that the adjudicative standard of clear and convincing evidence is not required for 
CROSS-APPELLANT IDAHO GROUND WATER APPROPRIATORS, INC.'S OPENING BRIEF AND 
RESPONSE BRIEF 25 
administrative determinations under the CM Rules. Rather, a preponderance of the evidence 
standard should be used when the Director makes an administrative determination of whether a 
senior is suffering material injury. 
D. The "Presumption of Entitlement to Full Quantity" Gives Proper Weight to a 
Senior's Decreed Right 
The Judgment and Decisions of the district COUlt imposed a "clear and convincing proof' 
standard because of the district court's belief that "[tlo conclude otherwise accords no 
presumptive weight to the decree." Clerk's R. 78 n. 12. However, the COUlt in AFRD2, in its 
analysis under heading "4. Failure to give legal effect to pmtial decree" held that presuming that 
the senior is entitled to his full quantity is the way to give the proper legal effect to the partial 
decree and did not impose a heightened evidentiary standard. AFRD, 143 Idaho at 876, 154 P.3d 
at 447. 
In a civil case or proceeding, a "presumption" "relieves the party in whose favor the 
presumption operates from having to adduce fUlther evidence of the presumed fact until the 
opponent introduces substantial evidence of the nonexistence of the fact." Bongiovi v. Jamison, 
110 Idaho 734, 738, 718 P.2d 1172, 1176 (1986), cited by Clear Springs Foods v. Clear Lakes 
Trout, 136 Idaho 761, 764, 40 P.3d 119, 122 (2002). 
In this case, the evidentiary presumption of entitlement to its full quantity relieved A&B 
from having to re-prove its authorized maximum quantity under its decreed water right. AFRD2, 
143 Idaho at 876-78,154 P.3d at 447-48. However, A&B is not guaranteed its quantity. In this 
case, the Director presumed that A&B was entitled to its full decreed quantity, but examined 
post-adjudication factors to detelmine that even though A&B was diverting less than its 
authorized maximum quantity it was not suffering from water shortage, was able to raise full 
crops on the available supply and could have divelted more water by improving some of its 
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wells. Ex. 121 at 1090-91; see too, Exs. 132, 155; R. 1114-15, 1117, 1120, 1148-50. A&B 
needs less water today for its sprinkler irrigated lands than it did to flood irrigate in 1963; in 
other words, A&B needs less water to accomplish the beneficial use under its water right to raise 
full crops. R. 1148-49 and 3107-08. This is precisely the inquiry this Comi expected the 
Director to make in a delivery call. In AFRD2, this Court explained the Director's duty to nse 
his professional judgment reasonably, and in a way that will "protect the public's interest in this 
valuable conunodity ... [but, this discretion 1 is certainly not unfettered discretion, nor is it 
discretion to be exercised without any oversight. That oversight is provided by the comis, and 
upon a properly developed record .... " AFRD2, 143 Idaho at 880, 154 P.3d at 451. A proper 
limit to this discretion was to presume the senior was entitled to his full quantity, not a 
heightened evidentiary standard. 
E. The Policy of the Ground Water Act is Best Served by the Preponderance of the 
Evidence Standard in Evaluating Whethel' the Senior is Materially Injured 
Groundwater administration is subject to the legislative mandate that "while the doctrine of 
'first in time is first in right' is recognized, a reasonable exercise of that right shall not block full 
economic development of underground water resources." I.C. § 42-226. Idaho Code § 42-226's 
principles of full economic development and reasonable pumping levels apply to distribution of 
water between junior and senior groundwater users. Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 252 
P. 3d 71, at **33; Baker v. Ore-Ida, 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627 (1973), Fmihelmore, other 
important policies apply when the Director is evaluating material injury and detelmining if a 
remedy is needed. These policies were recently surmnarized by this Court in Clear Springs 
Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, "Economy must be required and demanded in the use and application 
of water." Id at **54 citing Farmer's Co-operative Ditch Co. v. Riverside Irrigation District, 
Ltd., 16 Idaho 525, 535,102 P. 481,483 (1909). Fmiher, the "public waters of this state shall be 
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subjected to the highest and greatest duty." Jd citing Niday v. Barker, 16 Idaho 73, 79, 101 P. 
254, 256 (1909). "The policy of the law of this State is to secure the maximum use and benefit, 
and least wasteful use, of its water resources." Jd citing Poole v. Olaveson, 82 Idaho 
496,502,356 P.2d 61, 65 (1960). Along with these policy considerations, the Director must 
"equally guard all the various interests involved." Jd at **53-54 citing Idaho Code § 42-101. 
The district court's ruling here runs contrary to the Director's duty to equally guard all 
interests and to apply the Ground Water Act so as to not block full economic development of the 
aquifer. See, I.e. §§ 42-101 and 42-226. It also runs afonl of the policies of optimum beneficial 
use and reasonable use of water so as to not hoard water for one water user only. See Schodde v. 
Twin Falls Water Co., 224 U.S. 107 (1911). 
In light of these policies, evalnating whether or not a senior user needs his full quantity of 
water or is materially injured should be made by the Director under a preponderance of the 
evidence to ensure that junior users' interests that are inherent and specifically protected by these 
policies are equally guarded. This case involves the administration of Idaho's groundwater 
resources where a senior groundwater user is asking for curtailment of junior groundwater users; 
this case does not involve adjudication of water rights. Both sides have settled and decreed 
water rights and are putting the water to beneficial use. The unique issues presented in 
administration of groundwater, such as material injury, reasonableness, public interest and full 
economic development, must be based on the Director's discretion, which is best served by a 
preponderance of the evidence standard, not on a heightened standard. 
F. The Cases Cited by the District Court Are Adjudicative Cases, Not Applicable to 
Groundwater Administrative Cases 
The Judgment and Decisions incolTectly relies on cases that adjudicate water rights or seek 
to permanently alter water rights. None of those cases control the issue because this appeal 
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involves a groundwater administrative action under the CM Rules where the Director IS 
determining whether the senior is suffering materially injured. 
1. Cases to Grant New Appropriations Require Heightened Proof to Support A 
New Use from a Stream But do not Answer the Question Presented in this Case 
The district court cites to the 1904 decision Moe v. Harger, 101 Idaho 302, to support its 
assertion that the Director must evaluate material injUly under a heightened standard. Clerk's R. 
114-15. The argument that a senior user should be presumed to suffer material injury just 
because he receives less water than the maximum authorized rate of diversion was made in the 
AFRD2 case, with the district court there relying on Moe to conclude that "when a junior diverts 
or withdraws water in times of water shortage, it is presumed there is injury to the senior." 
AFRD2, 143 Idaho at 877, 154 P. 3d at 448. This Court, however, reversed the district court in 
AFRD2, explaining that Moe "was a case dealing with competing surface water rights, and tlus is 
a case involving interconnected ground and surface water rights." Id. The Court explained that 
"[t]he issues presented are simply not the same." rd. A major failing of the Judgment and 
Decisions is that it again tries to confine the CM Rules to the familiar constructs of surface water 
administration, rather than recognize that the CM Rules exist precisely because groundwater 
administration is significanfly different than surface water administration. 
Three of the cases cited in the Judgment and Decisions by the district court are cases that 
require junior surface appropriators to establish by clear and convincing evidence that there was 
sufficient water available from the source in order to support new appropriations: Cantlin v. 
Carter, 88 Idaho 179, 182, 397 P. 2d 761, 762 (1964) (case regarding whether to issue a new 
water right); (Josslyn v. Daly, 15 Idaho at 149, 96 P. at 572 (determination of quantity and source 
of an additional water right); Moe v. Harger, 10 Idaho 302, 77 P. 645 (case regarding whether 
there was sufficient water to grant a new appropriation). The reason for requiring a heightened 
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standard of proof to allow a new diversion on a stream was explained by the United States 
Supreme Court in Colorado v. Nell' Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984): 
Requiring Colorado to present clear and convincing evidence in support of its 
proposed diversion is necessary to appropriately balance the unique interests 
involved in water rights disputes between sovereigns. The standard reflects this 
Court's long-held view that a proposed diverter should bear most, though not all, 
of the risks of elToneous decision: "The harm that may res nit from disrupting 
established uses is typically certain and immediate, whereas the potential benefits 
from a proposed diversion may be speculative and remote." 
Id. at 316 (emphasis added). Supporting a proposed diversion whose benefit may be speculative 
and remote is different than the issue before the Director in this gronndwater administration case 
where a senior nser is asking the Director to cmiail hnndreds of established, decreed junior water 
rights. 
Likewise, the case of Neil v. Hyde, 32 Idaho 576, 578, 186 P. 710, 710 (1919) also involves 
an adjudication of rights amongst the patiies but is a case regarding res judicata and not about 
what standard of proof is required. In Jones v. Vanausdeln, 28 Idaho 743, 156 P. 615 (1916) a 
senior groundwater user was asking for curtailment of (an injunction against) junior groundwater 
users. The Jones case established that a groundwater administration dispute "differs somewhat 
from the ordinmy action for the adjudication of conflicting water rights on the same stream." Id. 
at 752, 681. At the time the Jones case was decided, this Court had already held the clear and 
convincing standard applies in the adjudication of surface water rights. Moe 10 Idaho at 307, 77 
P. at 648 1904 (holding in a surface water case that "subsequent appropriator who claims that 
such diversion will not injure the prior appropriator below him should be required to establish 
that fact by clear and convincing evidence."); see also Josslyn 15 Idaho at 149, 96 P. at 571-72. 
The Court's holdings in Moe and Josslyn did not prevent the Court in Jones from examining the 
senior's evidence to determine whether or not its claim of injury in the context of a dispute over 
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the use of groundwater was suppOliable. In other words, the considerations in cases like Moe 
and Josslyn, and hence the burdens and standard of proof in those cases did not entirely direct the 
Court's decision in Jones. 
Three other cases cited by the district cOUli involved quiet title actions, which permanently 
fixed water rights amongst the parties. Crow, 107 Idaho 461, 690 P. 2d 916, involved quiet title 
and issues of abandonment. Id. at 464 and 467, 690 P.2d at 918 and 922. The district court here 
also discussed at some length the quiet title cases of Silkey, 51 Idaho 344, 5 P .2d 1049 ("Silkey 
1") and Silkey, 54 Idaho 126, 28 P.2d 1037 ("Silkey II'') and claimed these cases stand for the 
proposition that administrative determination of injury by the Director requires a heightened 
standard of proof. While Silkey 1 and Silkey 11 involved groundwater rights, they are quiet title 
cases that determined how much water was available in the basin for appropriation and as such 
adjudicated water rights between the parties by affixing priority dates and quantities of the water 
rights. Silkey 1 at 348. In Silkey 1, the cOUlt effectively denied the right to use water to Tiegs 
and Ryan, because there was not enough available water to appropriate. 1d. at 348. The basis for 
the denial of any right to use water to these two users was because the district court found that 
"sixty miner's inches is the maximum amount of water that can be diverted from the artesian 
basin supplying the water to all the wells without depleting the supply available to respondent's 
well." Id. at 353 and 355. Silkey 1 is not a groundwater administrative case; rather it is an 
adjudication case that decrees water rights to the patiies. 1d. at 359. 
Silkey 11 has the same defendants. In Silkey II, the two defendants, who were effectively 
denied water rights in Silkey I, argued that the senior user's decreed right should be decreased 
and that there is sufficient water in the basin to support their appropriations. Silkey II, at 128. 
The Court found that the junior users (the new appropriators) must establish their facts by clear 
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and convincing evidence to decrease the senior's right and to prove that there was sufficient 
water to sustain their claimed appropriations. Id. Silkey 11 was simply a continuation of the 
previous adjudication suit involving the qnestion about whether the junior appropriator is entitled 
to a water right by showing that his appropriation will not injurc the senior user because there is 
sufficient water available in the source to appropriate. Silkey 11 does not establish that clear and 
convincing evidence is the standard required when deciding whether or not a senior user is 
materially injured, the remedy of which is to cllllail established, vested junior water rights. 
2. The Standard of Proof for Adjudicating Water Rights 0)' For PI'evailing on 
Affirmative Defenses Does Not Apply to Groundwater Administrative 
Determinations nnder the eM Rules. 
Finally, the district court cited two cases involving the abandonment or forfeiture of 
established water rights in SUppOlt of its conclusion that the Director must be convinced by clear 
and convincing evidence that the senior needs less water than his maximum decreed quantity to 
support a finding of no material injlllY. Gilbert, 97 Idaho 735, 552 P. 2d 1220 (involving 
abandonment, forfeiture and adverse possession and reqniring a heightened standard of proof); 
Jenkins, 103 Idaho 384, 647 P. 2d 1256 (holding that the Director had authority to consider 
forfeiture and abandomnent in evaluating a transfer, the result of which would have been a 
permanent change to the water right.) Admittedly, altering an established water right through 
abandonment or forfeiture should require heightened scrutiny since a real propelty right is being 
lost. Yet, neither of these cases control here where A&B' s water right is not being re-
adjudicated or examined in order to be permanently altered. 
In conclusion, none of the cases that the district court below relied upon support requiring the 
clear and convincing standard when detelmining whether material injury exists for purposes of 
administering groundwater rights under the administrative eM Rules. 
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VI. ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO A&B'S APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
A. Standard of Review for A&B's Issues on Appeal 
Review of the Agency Order under A&B's appeal is governed by the Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act (lDAPA), Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code § 42-1701A(4). Under lDAPA, the 
Court reviews an appeal from an agency decision based upon the record created before the 
agency. Idaho Code § 67-5277. The Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. I.e. § 67-5279(1); Castaneda v. 
Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262,1265 (1998). Review of pure questions of 
law is given fiee review by this Court. Vickers, 150 Idaho at 442, 247 P.3d at 669. 
The Court shall affirm the agency decision unless the Court finds that the agency's findings, 
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutOlY authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not 
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or, ( e) arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3); Castaneda, 130 Idaho at 926, 950 P.2d at 1265. In order 
to obtain the relief they seek, A&B must show that the agency erred in a manner specified in 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3), and that a substantial right has been prejudiced. I.C. § 67-5279(4); 
Barron v. IDWR, 135 Idaho 414, 417, 18 P .3d 219, 222 (2001). A&B as the appellant also bears 
the burden of documenting and proving that there was not substantial evidence in the record to 
suppOli the agency's decision. Payette River Property Owners Assn. v. Board of Comm 'rs, 132 
Idaho 551, 976 P.2d 477 (1999). If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside in 
whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary. I.C. § 67-5279(3) . 
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B. A&B's Irrigation Water Right No. 36-2080 is Subject to the Idaho Ground Water 
Act. 
District COUll Judge Wildman, district COUll Judge McKee in the FOUllh Judicial District, 
Hearing Officer Schroeder and the Director have all found that the Ground Water Act applies to 
pre-act groundwater rights. Their reasoning is sound. This Court should affirm the district 
COUll'S conclusion that the Ground Water Act applies to A&B's 1948 priority date water right. 
The district COUll recognized that whether the Ground Water Act applied to A&B's 1948 priority 
date water right is a question of law over which it exercised free review. Decision on Judicial 
Review at 12. 
1. This Court's Decision in Clear Springs v. Spackman Rejects A&B's Argument 
A&B argues that the Ground Water Act, adopted in 1951, does not apply to its 1948 priority 
date water right. A&B Opening Br. at 12-15. A&B also argues that the 1953 amendment to the 
Ground Water Act that protects senior users to a reasonable pumping level does not apply to its 
1948 priority date water right. Id. at 16-20. A&B argues that it is entitled to its historic 
pumping level, i.e. those levels that existed when they first began pumping from the ESP A 
without regard to reasonable pumping levels or the impacts on subsequent groundwater rights. 
Id. at 13. A&B's arguments were rejected in this Court's recent decision in Clear Springs Foods 
v. Spackman, 252 P.3d at **31. The COUll there held that the 1953 amendment to the Ground 
Water Act "modified the doctrine of first in time is first in right for ground water appropriators 
only with respect to their pumping levels." lei. at ** 31. The COUll further held that "the purpose 
of the 1953 amendment was to change the holding in Noh v. Stoner ... that a prior appropriator 
of ground water was protected to his historic pumping level." Id. The Court examined its 
decision in Baker v. Ore-Idaho Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho at 581-81, 513 P.2d at 633-34 and held 
that, "with respect to ground water pumping, the prior appropriation doctrine was modified so 
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that it only protects senior ground water appropriators to the maintenance of reasonable pumping 
levels in order to obtain full economic development of ground water resources." Id. **32. The 
COUlt found that "[tJhe prior appropriator was protected to a reasonable pumping level, not his 
historic pumping level." ld. at **33. Thus, this COUlt has already decided and rejected A&B's 
arguments in this appeal. However, if the COUlt does not find that its decision in Clear Springs 
v. Spackman resolves A&B's argument in this appeal, further argument is provided below. 
2. The Act's Plain Language and Case Law Supports the Conclusion that the 
Ground Water Act Applies to A&B's Water Right No. 36-2080 
In this case, the Hearing Officer below rejected A&B's argument in his Order Regarding 
Motion/or Dec1aratOlY Ruling. R. 1630-38. The Hearing Officer emphasized that I.C. § 42-229 
of the Ground Water Act provided that "the administration of all rights to the use of ground 
water, whenever or however acquired or to be acquired, shall, unless specifically excepted 
herefrom, be govemed by the provisions of this act." Id. at 5. (emphasis added). The Hearing 
Officer also noted that the only groundwater rights specifically excepted ii-om the retroactive 
application of the Ground Water Act were groundwater rights used for domestic purposes and for 
drainage or recovery purposes. R. 1631. See I.C. §§ 42-227, 42-228. A&B's irrigation 
groundwater right does not fit within either exception. These plain and unambiguous statutes 
clearly reveal the legislative intent that the Ground Water Act apply both retroactively and 
prospectively to "all" ground water rights "whenever" acquired unless those water rights are for 
domestic uses or for drainage or recovery uses. The Hearing Officer further noted that his 
interpretation of these statutes was fully supported by the case of Bakel'. R. 1632. 
On appeal, A&B requests that this Court judicially re-write I.C. § 42-229 by redacting or 
disregarding the phrase "all rights" and the phrase "whenever ... acquired" and thereby eliminate 
its retroactive eiIect and rely only on I.C. § 42-226. A&B's argument should be rejected. 
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In Baker, this Court addressed celiain irrigation groundwater rights. A number of those 
rights had priority dates of 1948 and 1950, which pre-dated the adoption of the Ground Water 
Act. There was an argument of whether all of the inigation water rights were subject to the 
Ground Water Act and its "reasonable pumping level" requirement. This Court prefaced its 
analysis by stating: "This COUli must for the first time, intelpret our Ground Water Act (I.C. sec. 
42-226 et seq.) as it relates to withdrawals of water from an underground aquifer." Bakel' 95 
Idaho at 576, 513 P.2d at 628. During its extensive analysis of the development ofIdaho water 
law, this Court ovelTuled the 1933 case of Noh, which had previously held that senior 
appropriators of groundwater were "forever" entitled to their historic pumping levels without 
regard to the reasonableness of those pumping levels. Contrary to A&B's argument that Noh is 
still good law and applies to its in'igation water right, this Court ovenuled Noh on two alternative 
bases. First, the holding in Noh violated the constitution because granting senior appropriators a 
perpetual entitlement to historic pumping levels was "inconsistent with our constitutionally 
enunciated policy of optimum development of water resources in the public interest." Baker, 95 
Idaho at 583, 513 P.2d at 635. Second, the legislative enactment of the Ground Water Act and 
its requirement of reasonable pumping levels were intended to eliminate "the harsh doctrine of 
Noh." Id. Based on these alternative bases, this Court agreed that all of the inigation water 
rights at issue in Baker were subject to the Ground Water Act and the reasonable pumping level 
requirement. Jd. at 584, 513 P.2d at 636. Consequently, this Court made it clear that the Noh 
case was ovenuled both judicially and legislatively and that the Ground Water Act applies to all 
rights pre-dating the Act. 
A&B attempts to avoid the holding in Bakel' by focusing its attention upon the subsequent 
case of Mussel' v. Higginson, 125 Idaho 392, 393, 871 P.2d 809, 810 (1994). The Mussel' case, 
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however, did not address the issue now argued by A&B. In Musser, this COUli stated in dicta 
that: "Both the original version and the current statute [i.e. I.e. § 42-226] make it clear that this 
statute does not affect rights to the use of ground water acquired before the enactment of the 
statute." Musser, 125 Idaho at 396, 871 P.2d at 813. However, this Court in Musser did not 
address the intelplay of I.C. § 42-226 with I.C. § 42-229. Even more significantly, the question 
on the application of the Ground Water Act to pre-I951 water rights was neither briefed nor 
argued on appeal in Musser. This is supported by the appellate briefing filed in that case. 
Musser was not a case that wrestled with applying the Ground Water Act or the reasonable 
pumping level requirement to pre-1951 ground water rights. The one case on point regarding the 
application of the Ground Water Act to pre-1951 ground water rights - Baker - is not even 
mentioned or cited in the Musser decision. Musser is simply a case which analyzed and applied 
Idaho law concerning writs of mandate. As explained by the Hearing Officer, "[t]he issue 
before the Court [in MiJsser] was a claimed failure of depaIimental action, not an analysis of the 
effect of the Ground Water Act on rights established before enactment ofthe Act." R. 1635. 
The district court in Moyle v. Idaho Dep't a/Water Resources, Case No. CV OT 08014978 
(4th Jud. Dist. July 13, 2009)1 was presented with the very same arguments A&B has presented 
in this case. After considering all of those arguments, the district court agreed that the Ground 
Water Act applied to pre-act water rights: 
I am persuaded by the reasoning advaIlced by the IDWR and in the brief of the amicus 
curiae. Simply recognizing the priority of the water right does not necessarily mean 
exclusion of such prior right from any administration or regulation by the depaIiment of 
water resources whatsoever. To so hold would emasculate the policy declaration of the first 
paragraph of I.C. § 42-226 and the broad sweep of I.e. § 42-229, that the administrative and 
regulatory provisions of the act were to apply to all rights, whenever and however acquired. 
Id. Memorandum Decision at 7. 
J A copy of this district court Memorandum Decision is attached as an addendum hereto. 
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Similarly, the district court here reasoned, "when construing the Act in its entirety, and 
specifically taking into account the plain language of I.C. § 42-229, it becomes clear that the 
Legislature intended a distinction between the 'right to the use of ground water' and the 
administration of all right to the use of ground water." Clerk's R. 57. Based on the foregoing, 
the district court's decision that the Ground Water Act applies to A&B's 1948 priority date water 
right should be affinned. 
3. Legislative History Shows that the Ground Water Act Applies to A&B's Right 
The conclusion reached by the Hearing Officer, Director, the district court here, and the 
district court in Moyle are further supp011ed by legislative history. A brief history and analysis 
of the Ground Water Act and Idaho's constitutional requirements of optimum beneficial use in 
the public interest supports the application of the Ground Water Act and the reasonable pumping 
level requirement to pre-1951 groundwater rights. 
It is a fundamental law of statutory construction that statutes that relate to the same subject 
are to be construed together in order to give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. 
Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 367, 670 P.2d 463, 468 (1983). In attempting to discern and implement 
the intent of the legislature, the court may seek edification from the statute's legislative history 
and contemporaneous context. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 978 P .2d 214 (Ct. App. 1999). 
In 1951, the Idaho Legislature enacted the Ground Water Act. Idaho's cunent Ground Water 
Act is codified at Idaho Code §§ 42-226 through 42-239. Section 1 of the Ground Water Act as 
passed in 1951 reads: 
SECTION 1 GROUND WATERS ARE PUBLIC WATER. -- It is hereby 
declared that the traditional policy of the state of Idaho, requiring the water 
resources of this state to be devoted to beneficial use in reasonable amounts 
tln'ough appropriation, is affinned with respect to the ground water resources of 
this state as said tenn is hereinafter defined. All ground waters in this state are 
declared to be the property of the state, whose duty it shall be to supervise their 
appropriation and allotment to those diverting the same for beneficial use. All 
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rights to the use of ground water in this state however acquired before the 
effective date of this act are hereby in all respects validated and confirmed. 
1951 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 200, § I, p. 423 (approved Mar. 19, 1951) (emphasis added). The 
last sentence of the Ground Water Act is merely a confilmation that prior water rights are 
validated and confirmed, but does not provide a specific exception to pre-1951 water rights, nor 
except them from the administrative decisions of the Director. Section 2 of the original Ground 
Water Act reads: 
SECTION 2. DRILLING AND USE OF WELLS FOR DOMESTIC PURPOSES 
EXCEPTED. - The excavation and opening of wells and the withdrawal of water 
therefrom for domestic purposes shall not be in any way affected by this act; 
providing such wells and withdrawal devices are subject to inspection by the 
department of reclamation and the department of public health. Rights to ground 
water for such domestic purposes may be acquired by withdrawal and use. 
1951 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 200, § 2, p. 424 (approved Mar., 1951) (emphasis added). Fmiher, 
the 1951 Gronnd Water Act in Section 4 specifically addressed administration of ground water 
rights and stated that administration of all non-excepted water rights (i.e. groundwater rights 
other than for domestic, drainage or recovery) "whenever or however acquired or to be acquired, 
shall, unless specifically excepted therefrom, be governed by the provisions of this act." 1951 
Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 200, § 4, p. 424 (emphasis added). Section 4 of the Ground Water Act is 
currently codified at Idaho Code § 42-229. 
In 1953, the Idaho Legislature amended Section I of the 1951 Ground Water Act but the 
Ground Water Act already applied to pre-1951 ground water rights as explained above and that 
was not changed. The 1953 amendment provided two important changes: I) it qualified the 
application of the "first in time first in right" doctrine as it applies to ground water rights and 2) 
it protected "early" ground water users but only as to a "reasonable pumping level" established 
by the Department, not to their historic pumping levels. Still, the only water rights "specifically 
excepted" were domestic rights, and drainage or recovery wells. I.C. §§ 42-227 and 42-228. 
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In 1978, the Idaho Legislature amended Section 2 of the Ground Water Act, now I.e. § 42-
227, to limit the exception on domestic wells stating that the drilling and use of wells for 
domestic purposes shall not be "subject to the permit requirement under section 42-229, Idaho 
Code." Finally, in 1987, the Idaho Legislature amended section 42-233 to restrict the use of 
geothermal ground water resources. 1987 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 347, § 3, p. 741. The 
Legislature also added language relating to the reasonable pumping levels as it related to 
geothermal resources under Idaho Code § 42-226: 
In determining a reasonable ground water pumping level or levels, the director of 
the department of water resources shall consider and protect the thermal and/or 
mtesian pressure values for low temperature geothenual resources and for 
geothermal resources to the extent that he determines such protection is in the 
public interest. 
The 1987 legislation also amended the last sentence of Section 1 of the 1951 Ground Water Act 
as follows: 
All This act shall not affect the rights to the use of ground water in this state 
however acquired before the effective date of this act are hcreby in all respects 
validated and confirmed its enactment. 
1987 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 347, § 1, p. 743. Importantly, Idaho Code § 42-229 regarding the 
administration of ground water rights remained unchanged and still states that administration of 
all rights to the use of ground water, "unless specifically excepted herefrom", are governed by 
the Ground Water Act. The original language of the 1951 Ground Water Act merely affinned 
the existence of prior water rights, but did not "specifically except" administration of them from 
the provisions of the Ground Water Act; the subsequent amendments do not change that fact. 
Consequently, because A&B's water right is not a domestic nor a drainage or recovery right, it is 
subject to the Ground Water Act. 
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4. Public Policy Supports that the Ground Water Act Applies 
This history of the Ground Water Act, coupled with this Court's specific application in Baker 
to historic water rights and this Court's recent decision in Clear Springs v. Spackman makes it 
obvious that the law to be applied to A&B's Delivery Call is that contained in the Ground Water 
Act and reasonable pumping levels and not historic pumping levels. As explained in Baker, the 
Ground Water Act is: 
consistent with the constitutionally enunciated policy of promoting optimum 
development of water resources in the public interests ... and that the Idaho 
legislature decided, as a matter of public policy, that it may sometimes be 
necessary to modify private property rights in ground water in order to promote 
full economic development of the resource .... Priority rights in ground water are 
and will be protected insofar as they comply with reasonable pumping levels .... 
Baker at 584, 513 P.2d at 636. 
A broad non-specific exception from the requirements under the Ground Water Act and 
specifically the reasonable pumping levels provisions for A&B would in effect allow A&B to 
unilaterally set a 1948 pumping level in the ESP A, regardless of whether that pumping level is 
reasonable. This would directly contradict Idaho constitutional and statutory law, including the 
holdings in Baker and Clear Springs v. Spackman. "It must be remembered that the policy of the 
law of this state is to secure the maximum use and benefit of its water resources." Mountain 
Home Irrigation Dist. v. DuffY, 79 Idaho 435, 319 P2d 965 (1957). Indeed, the governmental 
function in enacting the entire water distribution procedure under Title 42 of the Idaho Code is to 
further the state policy of securing the maximum use and benefit of its water resources. 
Nettleton v. Higginson, 98 Idaho 87, 91, 558 P.2d 1048,1052 (1977). 
Guaranteeing A&B its historic pumping levels would directly contradict the Ground Water 
Act's intent to not allow senior, historic users to block the full economic development of the 
state's underground water resources. A&B's argument that its ground water rights are not 
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subject to the Ground Water Act and its reasonable pumping level requirement is without merit. 
Thus, this COUlt should sustain the district cOUlt's decision. 
C. A&B is Not Water Short, Has Sufficient Water to Meet Its Beneficial Use Therefore 
The Director Need Not Set a Reasonable Pumping Level 
A&B argnes that the Director's failure to set a reasonable pumping level "violates his duty to 
administer water rights" pursuant to the Idaho Constitution, Idaho Code § 42-607 and CM Rule 
40. A&B' s Opening B1'. at 23. A&B' s argument misses the point. The Director concluded that 
A&B had sufficient water to meet its beneficial use. R. 1148-50. In fact, but for A&B's 
umeasonable means of diversion (i.e. its well drilling problems, well siting issues, refusal to 
interconnect some of its well systems, and its inherent delivery problems) it is likely that A&B 
could pump and deliver its full authorized water right volume. R. 1148-49. 
A&B argues on page 27 of its Opening Brief, "Here, the Director denied the call because 
A&B had not reached a reasonable pumping level." (emphasis in original). This is simply not 
correct. A&B cites to a page in A&B 's Reply in Support of Petition for Reconsideration in 
support of this contention. Arguably, one of the basis for denying A&B's delivery call was that 
reasonable pumping levels have not been exceeded, but as the record demonstrates, the Director 
determined that A&B was not suffering material injury and denied A&B's delivery call because 
A&B was not water short and had sufficient water available to meet its beneficial use. The 
Director also found, "A&B's poorest performing wells cannot per se be the measure of whether 
reasonable pumping levels have been exceeded; that the ESP A is not being mined; and that A&B 
has not been required to exceed reasonable pumping levels." R. 3321-22. The Director further 
concluded as a matter of law that "[t]here is no indication that ground water levels in the ESP A 
exceed reasonable pumping levels required to be protected under the provisions of Idaho Code § 
42-226." R. 3321. These conclusions are based in P31t on the facts that "[a]lthough ground water 
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levels throughout the ESPA have declined from their highest levels reached in the 1950's, 
ground water levels generally remain above pre-ilTigation developmental levels. There is no 
indication that ground water levels in the ESPA exceed reasonable ground water pumping 
levels .... " R. 1109; see also R. 3113. Substantial competent evidence supports these 
conclusions. Aggregate recharge to the ESP A substantially exceeds the aggregate groundwater 
withdrawals. See R. 1734-59 and Ex. 400 p. 8; Ex. 408. Further, water levels are likely 
stabilizing because of the 1992 moratorium on groundwater pennits, conversions from gravity to 
sprinkler ilTigation is nearly 85% complete and public processes such as the Comprehensive 
Aquifer Management Program are in place. Tr. Vol. VI, p.l343, L. 7-10; Tr. Vol. VII, p. 1400, 
L. 19-24- p. 1401, L. 11. 
The majority of A&B's problems accessing water are driven by the location of the B Unit. In 
the southwest portion of the B Unit, there are sedimentary interbeds that require site-specific 
considerations of the hydrogeology to detemline how best to withdraw water fi'om that source. R. 
1127-30, Ex. 124 at A&B 1196, A&B 1200, A&B 1203 and A&B 1222. In a 1948 USGS 
document, Mr. Nace noted that "[ d]ifferent well-constlUction and well-development methods 
would probably permit larger production from wells in the Burley Lake bed and other sediment." 
Ex. 124 at A&B 1200. The vast majority of the aquifer underlying A&B is a highly productive 
water-bearing basalt aquifer. R. 1127-28. 
A&B also argues that because it has been "impacted by declining aquifer levels and water 
supplies" the Director must "administer" (i.e. curtail) junior users. This is just another way to 
say that they are entitled to historic water levels which is not the law in Idaho as discussed 
above. FUliher, the lowering of the water table does not automatically constitute material injury 
as A&B argues; this "depletion equals injury" argument was rejected by this COUli in AFRD2. 
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AFRD2, 143 Idaho at 876-78, 154 P.3d at 447-49 (quoting A & B Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho 
Conservation League, 131 Idaho 411, 422, 958 P.2d 568, 579 (1997)). 
A&B's argument is not about the Director failing to "administer" water rights. Rather, it is 
about the Director's failure to curtail other junior users to provide A&B more water, even though 
the record shows that A&B is not suffering water shOllages. A summary of some of the key 
evidence supporting this conclusion is as follows: 
• A&B's B Unit farmers have been able to use the amount of water needed to raise full 
crops, meet their long-standing contracts and exceed the crop water requirements of 
adjacent farmers by 1 acre-foot per acre. Tr. Vol. X., p. 2069, L. 1-7; Vol., X., p. 
2040, L. 21-p. 2041, L. 8. 
• Exhibit 111 shows that surrounding surface water user Twin Falls Canal Company's 
rate of delivery is 5/8 per inch or 0.625 inches which is less than A&B's de1ivelY rate 
of 0.75 inches and certainly less than their "maximum rate of 0.88 inches per acre" 
that they claim they are entitled to. R. 3107. 
• A&B's B Unit fmmers use the same or more water to raise the same or similar crops 
as the lands surrounding the B Unit. Tr. Vol. X, p. pp. 2074-76, p. 2088, p. 2090, and 
2138 along with Exs. 427-10,427-11 and 427-12 show, as detelmined by the Director 
in his analysis, that the lands identified by A&B as water short simply are not short of 
water. 
• A&B's witnesses and IGW A's witnesses show that private farmers outside A&B use 
roughly 2 acre-feet per acre, while the average use by A&B farmers is about 3 acrc-
feet per acre. Ex. 574 at 12; Tr. Vol. X., p. 2135, L. 18-25; Tr. Vol. x., p. 2088, L. 
23- p. 2089, L. 11. Further, A&B's delivery policies promote inefficiencies. Id. and 
Tr. Vol. IV., p. 657, L. 22- p. 658, L. 2; Stevenson Tr. Vol. x., p. 2075, L. 11 - p. 
2076, L. 18; Tr. Vol. X. p. 2135, L. 5-8. 
• Despite their claims shortage, A&B' s fmmers have increased their production and 
exceed county averages for crop yields. cf Exs. 357 and 355A, and 358. 
• Exhibits 409, and 430-C show that A&B's aggregate diversions have increased in 
recent years from 150,000 acre-feet to over 175,000 acre-feet. 
• A&B's own Exhibits 229A-O, 230-B-N, Ex. 231B-F all show that the members who 
claim to be water short continue to spread their water on expansion and enlargement 
acres that were not originally intended to be irrigated with water under water right no. 
36-2080. In other words, water right no. 36-2080 now provides water to 2,063 more 
acres than it was historically developed to serve. Exs. 405, 406 and 407. 
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• A&B developed its project near the peak of the ground water level but the ESP A is 
still above the level that existed prior to surface water irrigation. R. 1739-1740. 
• A&B's water right allows it to supplement that supply by intercolmecting its wells or 
wells systems, to add additional points of diversion as needed or to replace abandoned 
or low yielding wells. Yet, A&B has refused to explore intercomlection R. 1909-11, 
1943,3096, Tr. Vol. IV, p. 704, L. 8-13. 
While there is substantial and competent evidence to support the Director's conclusion that 
reasonable pumping levels have not been exceeded, there are many valid reasons why the 
Director denied A&B' s delivery call. 
D. The Director Properly Evaluated A&B's Use and Diversion of Water Under its 
Unique Water Right 
A&B insists that the Hearing Officer, the Director and the district court concluded that A&B 
must intercoilllect its "entire" system before it is allowed to seek "administration." A&B 
Opening Br. at 36-38. However, this argument misstates the record. Contrary to A&B's 
asseltion, the Director did not place an unlawful condition to interconnect its entire system 
before seeking administration nnder its water right. Rather, the Director adopted the Hearing 
Officer's conclusion that A&B has a duty to "maximize the use of [the] flexibility [in its water 
right] ... before it can seek cUitailment or compensation from juniors." R. 3096. This 
conclusion was reasonably conditioned by recognizing the fact that topography limits A&B's 
ability to intercoilllect its entire system, thus, "it is not A&B's obligation to show intercoilllection 
of the entire system to defend its water rights and establish material injury." Id. As a matter of 
fact and law, however, A&B can interconnect its well systems. Ex. 157 A, 481, Tr. Vol. VI, p. 
1318,L.22-p.1319,L.4. 
A&B argues that the Director must evaluate its claim of injUly to its water right on a well-by-
well basis and is not allowed to hold A&B to the flexibility to interconnect its well system that is 
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part of its water right. A&B Opening Br. at 35. When the Bureau developed the A&B project in 
the 1950a, there was an understanding that the service area for the A&B Irrigation District 
encompassed a variety of lands and that the aquifer underlying A&B had a variety of 
characteristics. Ex. 124 at 11-14; Ex. 470. Historical documents show that at the time of 
development the Bureau chose to develop wells in the high producing basalt aquifer located 
primarily in the nOlihern pOliion of the B Unit and later moved to the "922 problem area" in the 
southwest portion. Ex. 152P and QQ; Tr. Vol. VII, p. 1368,1. 16- p. 1369,1. 9; Tr. Vol. I, p. 
64, 1. 18- p. 65, 1. 2. When the Bureau developed the wells in the southwest portion, it was 
known that the water-bearing characteristics of the aquifer underlying the southwest pOliion were 
poor and differed from the hydrogeologic setting for a majority of the B Unit. Jd. Yet, the 
Bureau consciously decided to drill wells in the sedimentary zones of the southwest area. 
Ultimately, the Bureau re-drilled nearly 50% of its wells throughout the project within a ten-year 
period. Ex. 404. 
Although withdrawing water from the sedimentary interbeds is more difficult than the higher 
transmissive areas located in the nOlihern part of the B Unit, A&B is not without remedy. First, 
A&B could employ hydrogeologic consultants to detelmine whether or not small or 
supplemental wells would result in additional well yield for its claimed water short wells as 
recommended by Dr. Ralston and could use different well screens to enhance success. Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 196, 1. 4-9; Ex. 400 at 36. Further, A&B could consider the interconnection of its wells or 
well systems in order to supplement its supply. "[I]t is ... clear that the licensing requested by 
the Bureau of Reclamation envisioned flexibility in moving water from one location to another. 
Consequently, there is an obligation of A&B to take reasonable steps to maximize the use of that 
flexibility to move water within the system before it can seek curtailment or compensation from 
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jWlior users." R. 3097. Dr. Petrich showed that limited intercomlection of some well systems 
that are adjacent to well systems with surplus supply is possible. Ex. 481. The Director properly 
weighed the evidence to conclude that A&B must take advantage of the flexibility of its water 
rights and interconnect its wells. 
A&B fwiher argues that llilless its partial decree from the SRBA Court included a condition 
that it must intercOlmect its well systems, then the Director is precluded from requiring A&B to 
take advantage of the flexibility under its water right that allows for intercOlmection of its wells. 
This argument would eliminate the Director's ability to examine a water users' means of 
diversion, its inigation method and application as set fOlih in CM Rule 40.01.d. (system 
diversion, conveyance efficiency, method of irrigation water application), 40.01.g. (can the 
senior's need be met using reasonable diversion, reasonable conveyance efficiency and 
reasonable conservation practices) and 40.01.h. (can the senior's need be met using alternate 
reasonable means of diversion). Fwiher, A&B's argument ignores the fact that a reasonable 
means of diversion is an inherent condition on every water right. 
A&B's water right, with its 177 wells and the right to divert from 188 wells that are not tied 
to any particular diversion rate or parcel of land, provides it with ultimate flexibility to water 
lands within its boundaries with any well or any combination of wells. While A&B does not 
want the Director to limit its flexibility in moving water between its wells or well systems, it 
wants to dictate to the Director that he only be allowed to consider individual wells in evaluating 
material injury. A&B simply cannot have it both ways. The Director properly considered 
A&B's water right and required that A&B maximize its interconnections in a reasonable manner 
before he will consider curtailing outside junior users. The Director's order on this issue is 
reasonable and based on substantial, competent evidence in the record and the district court 
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found that he did not abuse his discretion on this issue. As such, the Director' s and the district 
court decision in this issue should be affirmed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Administration of water rights and distribution of water between water users serves a 
different function than the adjudication of water rights that permanently assigns title, fixes 
priorities and quantities or alters the elements of water rights. The two types of proceedings 
require different standards of proof. In evaluating material inj ury under the CM Rules the 
Director must review the evidence under a preponderance standard in order to give the proper 
effect to all of the considerations involved in administering groundwater rights. IG W A asks this 
COUlt to reverse the district court decision and its remand and find that clear and convincing 
evidence is not required for administrative determinations regarding material injury and as such, 
it follows that the court should affil111 the Director' s decision that A&B's water right was 
properly evaluated, reasonable pumping levels have not been exceeded and as such, A&B's 
water right is not materially injured. 
A&B's water right 36-2080 is subject to the Ground Water Act and its argument that it 
shonld be entitled to its historic water level is entirely contrary to the express language and 
purpose of the Ground Water Act. The district COUlt's decision on this issue should also be 
affirmed. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Memorandum Decision 
Moyle v. Idaho Department of Water Resources 
4th Jud. Dist. 
Case No. CV OT 08 014978 
07/13/2009 17:21 FAX 2082877529 FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IaJ 002/012 
:~ _______ ~~~':5:3d?'-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH MOYLE, LYNN MOYLE and 
MICHAEL MOYLE, individually, and 
CITY OF EAGLE, 
Petitioner and Cross Petitioner, 
v. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER 
RESOURCES, 
Respondent 
Case No. CV OT 08 014978 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
This matter is before the court on administrative appeal from an order issued by 
the Idaho Department of Water Resources adjudicating the rights of parties under certain 
applications for ground water permits.! The Moyle family, a protestant before the agency 
below, initiated the judicial proceedings by petition for judicial review. The City of 
Eagle, the applicant before the agency below, appeared in this action by way of a "cross 
I 'lbe administrative caption on this mater was "In the malter of applications to appropriate water nos. 63-
32089 and 63-32090 in the name oftlle City of Eagle." The administrative caption was used as the caption 
in the initial pleadings rued in this litigation. I bave recast the caption here in the manner adopted by the 
parties in subsequent submissions to the court, to reflec! the identity of the parties in interest to this 
proceeding. 
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petition," generally challenging the position of the Moyles. It has filed its own direct 
action for administrative appeal against the agency's final order in a separate action that 
is not consolidated in this action. The Idaho GrolUld Water Appropriator's Inc. was not a 
party to the administrative proceedings below and has been permitted to submit an 
amicus curiae brief in this action. 
For reasons stated, I conclude that if the merits are to be reached, the final order 
of the Department should be affinned as to all issues raised in this proceeding. However, 
I conclude that the petition filed was lUltimely and, therefore, the court lacks jurisdiction. 
The petition and cross-petition should be dismissed. 
Facts and Procedural History 
In January of2005, the City of Eagle filed two applications with the IDWR for 
permits to appropriate grolUld water, being essentially permits to dig two wells at specific 
locations. A number of parties and entities, including the Moyles, protested the 
applications. A hearing officer was designated by the IDWR, and hearings were held. 
It is not disputed that the Moy les maintain a number of artesian wells under water 
rights that were acquired prior to 1953. The wells desired by the City of Eagle would be 
approximately one mile from the wells belonging to the Moyles and would tap into the 
aquifer that probably serves the Moyles' wells. The well water from Moyle wells is used 
for both domestic and non-domestic purposes. Domestic water is not involved in these 
proceedings. 
After an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer issued his findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and recommendations for final order. In his findings, the hearing 
officer concluded that the permits of the city should be granted subject to conditions. As 
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is relevant to this appeal, the hearing officer concluded that the water rights of the Moyles 
predated the 1953 enactment ofthe Idaho Ground Water Act, and therefore were not 
subject to regulation or administration by the department. He concluded that the Moyles 
were entitled to protection in their wells from any encroachment by the city wells at their 
"historical water levels." 
The hearing officer's preliminary orders were transmitted to the director ofIDWR 
for final action. In February of2008 the director ofIDWR issued an order wherein the 
director accepted the hearing officer's conclusion approving the application of the city 
subject to conditions. However, he did not accept the hearing officer's conclusion that the 
Moyles' agricultural and non-domestic water rights were entitled to the level of 
protection as stated; the director concluded that the Moyles' rights were subject to 
administration by the department, including determination and regulation in accordance 
with "reasonable pumping levels" as defined and determined under the Idaho Ground 
Water Act. 
Motions for reconsideration were filed, and further hearings before the director 
were held. By an order dated July 3, 2008, the director denied the motion to reconsider 
and affinned the final order entered in February, without modification on any ofthe areas 
relevant to this appeal. The final order on reconsideration was manually signed and 
manually dated by the director on July 3. A certificate of service signed by the 
administrative assistant to the director indicates that service by mail was attempted on 
that day. 
Apparently, the mailing ofthis order was not sufficient as to all of the parties and 
attorneys. On July 16, 2008, the director's administrative assistant mailed everything out 
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again. She included a letter of transmittal covering the order and a new certificate of 
mailing, which included several corrections and additional individuals and entities not 
identified on the first certificate of service. The transmitta1letter and new certificate of 
mailing are dated July 16, 2008. In her letter, the administrative assistant advised, 
"Therefore, for the purpose of filing an appeal, the date of service referred to in the 
enclosed order is now July 16, 2008." 
The petition for judicial review in this case was filed by the Moyles on August 11, 
2008. This date was within 28 days of the second mailing and corrected service of the 
order on July 16, but was more than 28 days' from the date appearing on the document 
entitled "Order on Reconsideration," which was July 3, 2008. The City of Eagle entered 
this case by a cross petition, filed after the petition of the Moyles. The city's participation 
in this case is limited to the issues raised in cross petition against the Moyles' protest. 
Issues on Appeal 
The Moyles contend that the sole issue presented in this case is whether the their 
water rights are subject to any regulation or administration by the IDWR Specifically, 
the contend that regulation under ''reasonable ground water pumping levels" as defined 
and limited in the Idaho Ground Water Act at Idaho Code § 42-226 do not apply to their 
non-domestic water rights because their rights have priority dates earlier than the 
effective date of the act. 
The City contends that the Moyles have no standing to raise this issue before the 
court because (1) they failed to raise this issue before the agency, and (2) there is no 
cognizable injury under the facts of this case because the only potential injury is to water 
pressure, and pressure is not a protected element of a water right. 
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The IDWR contends, in a last minute round of briefing, that the recent case of 
Erickson v Board of Engineers, _ Idaho -,203 P.3rd 1251 (2009) applies, that the 
time for appeal begins on the date of the order not the date of service, and that the 
petition for judicial review in this case was, therefore, untimely. It is of note that the 
agency did not raise this issue by motion when the petition was filed, nor did it raise this 
issue in the principle round of briefing to the issues raised in the appeal. The issue was 
raised only after the initial briefing was closed, and just prior to the date originally 
scheduled for oral argument. Because of this, the oral argument was rescheduled and all 
parties were offered the opportunity to submit briefs on the issue. 
If the Moyles' petition is dismissed on the jurisdictional basis, the City'S cross 
petition in this case goes with it. 
Analysis 
A. The Ground Water Act applIes to water rights acqutred prior to enactment 
The principle issue was exhaustively briefed by the parties in extremely well 
written and well argued briefs, including the brief submitted by the amicus curiae. I am 
satisfied that previous Idaho cases may surround the issue, but none are squarely on 
point. Of the three cases that appear closest, none clearly address the issue. Baker v. Ore 
Ida Foods, 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627(1973) does not address the issue of regulation or 
administration of rights acquired before enactment of the Ground Water Act in Idaho. 
Parker v Wallentine. 103 Idaho 506, 650 P.2d 648 (1982) deals with domestic water, 
which is specifically excluded by the statute and is not involved in this case. Musser v 
Higginson. 125 Idaho 392, 871 P.2d 809 (1994) was an action in mandamus to compel 
the director to act. The court there held only that the director was obligated to act. but did 
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not defme the limits or restrictions on his authority with respect to rights existing before 
the enactment of the statute. The discussion on point was directed to issues in mandamus, 
and is dicta in any event on anything germane to the case here. I am not persuaded that an 
answer is apparent from prior cases; rather, I conclude the issue is one of first impression 
in Idaho. 
Tension exists both within I.e. § 42-226, and between this section and I.e. § 42-
229. The first part of the first paragraph ofI.e. § 42-226 provides that acquiring water 
rights by appropriation to beneficial use, under the doctrine of "first in time, first in right" 
is to be recognized, provided that this recognition is subject to regulation by the director 
in the maintenance of "reasonable ground water pumping levels." However, in the last 
sentence of the first paragraph thereof; it is provided that, "This act shall not affect the 
rights to the use of ground water in this state acquired before its enactment." Then, in 
I.e. § 42-229, it is provided that, ..... the administration of all rights to the use of ground 
water, whenever or however acquired or to be acquired, shall, unless specifically 
exempted herefrom, be governed by the provisions of this act." 
The Moyles contend that the phrase in section 226 to the effect that the act shall 
not apply to rights acquired before enactment of the statute effectively trump the 
conflicting provisions of the act that seem to say that the prior rights are subject to some 
level of regulation and administration by the director. 
IDWR points to the policy language of the first paragraph of section 226 together 
with the language of section 229 and contend that, while the prior rights may be 
"recognized," this does not preclude such rights from being subject to some level of 
regulation, such as the "reasonable pumping levels" mandated by other provisions of the 
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act. IDWR points to the language of section 229 providing that all rights to the use of 
ground water "whenever or however acquired" are subject to administration and 
regulation by the director, and contends that the only exceptions to the act are contaiued 
in LC. §§ 42-227 and 42-228, neither of which are relevant here. 
I am persuaded by the reasoning advanced by the IDWR and in the brief ofthe 
amicus curiae. Simply recognizing the priority of the water right does not necessarily 
mean exclusion of such prior right from any administration or regulation by the 
department of water resources whatsoever. To so hold would emasculate the policy 
declaration of the first paragraph ofLC. § 42-226 and the broad sweep oflC. § 42-229, 
that the administrative and regulatory provisions of the act were to apply to all rights, 
whenever and however acquired. 
While the issue is not squarely addressed in prior cases, I am persuaded by the 
rationale expressed in Baker v Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., supra. In that case, Justice Shepard, 
after a careful analysis ofthe development of water law in Idaho, observed that one 
purpose of the Ground Water Act was to promote the constitutionally enunciated policy 
of optimum development of water rights in the public interest. To that end, he concluded 
that the Ground Water Act could be applied to water rights acquired prior to the 
enactment of the act and overruled a doctrine previously expressed in Noh v Stoner, 53 
Idaho 651, 26 P.2d 1112 (1933), to the effect that a senior ground water user had the 
unfettered right to preclude interference from a junior user. He concluded instead that the 
Ground Water Act was '~ntended to eliminate the harsh doctrine of Noh." 
In this case, there was no evidence of actual interference with the water rights of 
Moyle. All that was offered was speculative testimony that the wells desired by the city 
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would probably draw from the aquifer used by the Moyles, and would probably impact 
pumping and pressure levels. No conclusions were offered as to the actual impact. The 
Moyles do not pump their water. Their wells are fed by artesian pressure. Although there 
was a finding by the hearing officer in this case that the Moyles' rights might be affected, 
and a conclusion that if so, they would be entitled to redress from the city in order to be 
made whole, it is uncertain at this point to what degree the rights of Moyle would 
actually be impacted. The director, in revising the hearing officer's conclusion on this 
point, did not say that the Moyles had no rights in the matter. Rather, he concluded that 
the hearing officer erred in concluding that the Moyles were entitled to protection based 
on "historical pumping levels" by reason of their priority. The director's final order 
concluded that as to the agricultural, non-domestic uses, the Moyles' prior rights would 
be subject to administration or regulation by the department under the statutory and 
regulatory provisions pertaining to "reasonable pumping levels." 
To my mind, providing that one's prior water right may be subject to some degree 
of administration by the department does not abrogate the principle of right by 
appropriation or the doctrine of first in time, first in right. The statute clearly does 
provide that all ground waters are the property ofthe state, and that the state is obligated 
to supervise their appropriations and allotments. While the statute provides that rights 
acquired prior to the enactment of the statute are to be recognized, it also provides an 
overriding policy of requiring that even those prior-acquired and first-in-time water 
resources are to be devoted to beneficial uses and in reasonable amounts, and it does 
impose upon the director the duty of administration and enforcement. I conclude that the 
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director's determinations in this regard are consistent with the historical, constitutional 
and statutory mandates expressed in Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods. Inc .• supra. 
The conditions adopted and imposed by the director in his fmal order are not 
inconsistent with these overriding policies. Accordingly, I decline to disturb the director's 
conclusion on this point. The final order of the director, as affirmed by him after 
reconsideration, should be affirmed by the courts. 
B. Determination of whether "pressure" is a protected interest is premature. 
Given my conclusion affirming the director's order that the rights at issue in this 
case are subject to some level of administration and regulation under the Ground Water 
Act, the issue raised by the city is premature. For this reason, I do not address the 
question of whether water pressure, as in the case of water flowing from an artesian well, 
can be an element of a water right subject to protection by prior appropriation. 
C. Under the Erickson decision, this court has no jurisdiction. 
I am constrained to conclude that Erickson v Idaho Board of Professional 
Engineers, _ Idaho _, 203 P.3d 1251 (2009), does apply to this case, and in accordance 
with the dictates of that decision, I am constrained to conclude that the court has no 
jurisdiction to hear this administrative appeal. 
However, I believe the Erickson decision to be wrongly decided, and I suspect 
that the decision cannot stand. The decision uIDlecessarily disregards long established 
administrative practices of triggering action from the date of service of administrative 
decisions and orders, rather than the date applied to the order or decision itself. I would 
observe from empirical and pragmatic experience that most agencies do not give much 
significance to the date placed on the documents that are prepared, but rather concentrate 
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on the date these documents ale actually distributed, both internally and to affected 
parties. Language in administrative orders universally recite that any appeal time begins 
with the date of service - not with the date appearing on the order. In the instant case, 
separate correspondence from the agency advised all parties that the appeal time would 
run from the date of the correspondence rather than from the date of the order. (The 
correspondence enclosed a revised certificate of service, prepaled to correct a prior error 
in distribution of the order on reconsideration.) I think it of note here that the agency 
itself did not raise any question over the timing of the appeal until well after the Erickson 
dedsion was released. 
Were it not for the unmistakable reach of the Erickson decision, I would conclude 
that the determination of when an order or decision of an agency is to be deemed "final" 
or "issued" within the palameters ofIdaho Code § 67-5273(2) is an appropriate executive 
determination to be made by the agency. I would find as a fact in this case that the actions 
by the agency itself clearly established that the agency did not consider the orders it 
promulgated to be "issued" or "final" until the pertinent document was actually placed in 
distribution to the paIties, and that, according to the agency's own declalations and 
determinations, this did not occur until a satisfactory mailing of the order to all parties 
occurred. I would therefore conclude that the petitions in this case were timely filed 
within 28 days of the date of issuance of the order on reconsideration, that date being July 
16, 2008, the date a satisfactory mailing to all paIlies and entities occurred. However, the 
Erickson decision preempts this conclusion and factual determination, and directs instead 
that I must observe the date of order as being detenninative. 
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Although I confirm that Erickson does control, I have also ruled on the merits in 
this case as a matter of expediency. This may obviate the need for the parties to pursue a 
needless loop through the appellate process in order to reach the merits of the case, in the 
event this decision is appealed and the Erickson decision is revised, withdrawn or 
overturned along the way. 
Conclusion 
Under the conclusion stated in Erickson v Idaho Board of Professional Engineers, 
supra, the petition for judicial review was untimely filed, and should be dismissed. Ifthe 
merits of the case are reached, the decision of the Director of the Department of Water 
Resources as to the applicability of the Ground Water Act in Idaho upon the water rights 
of the Detitioners should be affirmed in all resnecK Under either cnndll~inn, en.f., hilt nn 
attorney fees, are awarded to the respondent IDWR and against the petitioner Moyle. No 
award to the cross-petitioner. 
It 1:) ~u Ul Uen::\l. 
13 1'-Dated this: day of July 2009. 
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